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Give Me Liberty or Give
Me . . . Alternatives?
ENDING CASH BAIL AND ITS IMPACT ON PRETRIAL
INCARCERATION
“No one truly knows a nation until one has been inside its jails.
A nation should not be judged by how it treats its highest
citizens but its lowest ones.”1
INTRODUCTION
When police officers arrested seventeen-year-old Kalief
Browder for allegedly stealing a backpack, they said, “We’re just
going to take you to the precinct. Most likely you will go home.”2
But Kalief Browder never went home, and instead, spent the next
three years of his life languishing in a Rikers Island prison cell.3
After police arrested Browder, a judge set his bail at $3,000, a fee
that his family could not afford, and Browder spent years
suffering in Rikers Island before the prosecution eventually
dismissed his case.4 After three years of jail time and nearly two
years of solitary confinement, Kalief Browder committed suicide
at the age of twenty-two.5
Unfortunately Browder’s case is not an anomaly,6 but a
tragic example of the norm that is due in part to a cash bail system
1 Jennifer Lackey, The Measure of a Country Is How it Treats its Prisoners. The
U.S. Is Failing, WASH. POST (Feb. 6, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/themeasure-of-a-country-is-how-it-treats-its-prisoners-the-us-is-failing/2019/02/06/8df29acc2a1c-11e9-984d-9b8fba003e81_story.html [https://perma.cc/TSN2-GFNP].
2 Jennifer Gonnerman, Before the Law, NEW YORKER (Oct. 6, 2014), http://www.
newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/06/before-the-law [https://perma.cc/4EL9-DRVS] (internal
quotation marks omitted).
3 Michael Schwirtz & Michael Winerip, Kalief Browder, Held at Rikers Island for 3
Years Without Trial, Commits Suicide, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/
2015/06/09/nyregion/kalief-browder-held-at-rikers-island-for-3-years-without-trial-commitssuicide.html [https://perma.cc/BT6Z-PX9G].
4 See Peter Holley, Kalief Browder Hanged Himself After Jail Destroyed Him.
Then ‘a Broken Heart’ Killed his Mother, WASH POST. (Oct.18, 2016); Wendy R. Calaway &
Jennifer M. Kinsley, Rethinking Bail Reform, 52 U. RICH. L. REV. 795, 799 (2018).
5 See Holley, supra note 4; Schwirtz & Michael, supra note 3.
6 The havoc that cash bail has wreaked on defendant’s lives is harrowing: Bill
Peyser, a seventy-three-year-old cab driver with no prior criminal record, was charged with
attempted murder when confronting his noisy neighbors. Despite eventually being found not
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that disproportionally impacts minorities and the indigent.7 The
United States has a prison population of over two million; nearly five
hundred thousand more than China, the next highest country.8 Of
this two million plus, around 540,000 people are pretrial detainees,
or better put, these individuals have been arrested, but have not yet
been convicted of a crime and are presumed to be innocent.9 Even
though the prison population has steadily increased in the last
fifteen years, the conviction rate has remained stable, exhibiting
that the “[d]etention of the legally innocent has been consistently
driving jail growth.”10
One of the main drivers of the growing rate of incarceration
has been the cash bail system.11 Congress had envisioned the cash
bail system for the primary purpose of reducing pretrial crime and
guilty on all charges, Peyser spent nearly six months in jail while awaiting trial because he could
not afford his $625,000 bail; Richard Stanford, a sixty-three-year-old Vietnam veteran, spent
weeks in jail for trespassing after being unable to post a $2,600 bail; Kenneth Humphrey, a
retired black shipyard worker, was assessed a bail of $350,000 for stealing $5 and a bottle of
cologne. See Scott Shackford, Innocent Until Proven Guilty, But Only if You Can Pay, REASON
(July 14, 2018), https://reason.com/archives/2018/07/14/innocent-until-proven-guilty-b [https://
perma.cc/3WBL-SPP5]; Arpit Gupta & Ethan Frenchman, The U.S. Bail System Punishes the
Poor and Rewards the Rich, QUARTZ (Feb. 2, 2017), https://qz.com/900777/the-us-bail-systempunishes-the-poor-and-rewards-the-rich/ [https://perma.cc/EJ3F-87WA]; Evan Sernoffsky, SF
Inmate in Landmark Battle over Bail Wins Release, S.F. CHRON. (May 3, 2018, 7:32 PM), https://
www.sfchronicle.com/news/article/Judge-orders-defendant-in-legal-bail-battle-to-be-12885
426.php [https://perma.cc/6DBE-58Z4].
7 See Adam Looney & Nicholas Turner, Work and Opportunity Before and After
Incarceration, BROOKINGS INST. (Mar. 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/
2018/03/es_20180314_looneyincarceration_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/4PPP-WAJ3] (finding
that boys born into the bottom ten percent of income earners are twenty times more likely to
end up in prison as young adults than those born into the top ten percent); Ashley Nellis, The
Color of Justice: Racial and Ethnic Disparity in State Prisons, SENT’G PROJECT (June 14,
2016), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/color-of-justice-racial-and-ethnic-dispa
rity-in-state-prisons/ [https://perma.cc/E8HP-KND8] (“African Americans are incarcerated in
state prisons at a rate that is 5.1 times the imprisonment of whites.”).
8 Highest to Lowest—Prison Population Total, WORLD PRISON BRIEF, http://
www.prisonstudies.org/highest-to-lowest/prison-population-total?field_region_taxonomy_tid=All
[https://perma.cc/UR5Z-9JGJ]. In fact, if every state in the U.S. was imagined to be an independent
nation, twenty-three states would have higher incarceration rates than any other country. Peter
Wagner & Wendy Sawyer, States of Incarceration: The Global Context 2018, PRISON POL’Y INIT.
(June 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/global/2018.html [https://perma.cc/5EY3-XUGN].
9 See Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie
2019, PRISON POL’Y INIT. (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2018.
html [https://perma.cc/M7AU-YSSL].
10 BERNADETTE RABUY & DANIEL KOPF, PRISON POL’Y INIT., DETAINING THE POOR 1
(May 10, 2016), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/DetainingThePoor.pdf [https://perma.cc/
A5YG-NY3C]; see MELISSA NEAL, JUST. POL’Y INST., BAIL FAIL: WHY THE U.S. SHOULD END THE
PRACTICE OF USING MONEY FOR BAIL 26 (Sept. 11, 2012), http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/
justicepolicy/documents/bailfail.pdf [https://perma.cc/QEW6-VEA2] (“A 2012 study suggested
that . . . more than [fifty] percent of innocent defendants pled guilty to get a lower sentence
rather than risk a conviction . . . .”).
11 See Jared Keller, How the Money Bail System Perpetuates America’s Mass
Incarceration Problem, PAC. STANDARD (Aug. 26, 2016), https://psmag.com/news/how-themoney-bail-system-perpetuates-americas-mass-incarceration-problem [https://perma.cc/5PDGN58Z] (“[T]he use of money bail by judges to detain suspects ahead of a formal trial may actually
be creating more criminals than it punishes.”); Sawyer & Wagner, supra note 9.
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flight,12 but the majority of pretrial detainees are charged with
nonviolent offenses, where these risks are exceedingly low.13
Instead, the cash bail system has created a two-tiered system of
injustice, akin to a modern-day debtor’s prison, where the poor are
imprisoned and the rich are released.14
The resulting inequities stemming from money bail regimes
have grave consequences for both the pretrial detainee and the
public at large.15 Pretrial detainees have a tougher time mounting
a defense and are much more likely to enter into guilty pleas and
receive longer sentences than those who can afford bail.16 The
detention itself places a long-term toll on the defendant’s mental
health, current and future employment prospects, and family wellbeing.17 From a societal perspective, these bail policies continue to
strengthen the firm grip of institutional racism in the U.S. criminal
justice system, with money bail disproportionately affecting
minorities.18 Furthermore, the financial cost of money bail places
an enormous burden on American taxpayers and state budgets. In
2018, for example, the Hamilton Project estimated that pretrial
detention “cost[ ] taxpayers roughly $11.71 billion each year.”19
12 Originally, the sole reason for bail was to ensure a defendant reappeared in
court. Following the Bail Reform Act of 1984, many jurisdictions now also factor in the
defendant’s dangerousness to the community. See infra Section I.B.
13 See RAM SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., VERA INST. JUST., INCARCERATION’S FRONT DOOR:
THE MISUSE OF JAILS IN AMERICA, 5 (2015), http://www.safetyandjusticechallenge.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/01/incarcerations-front-door-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/59PD-LMST]
(“[N]early 75 percent of the population of both sentenced offenders and pretrial detainees are
in jail for nonviolent traffic, property, drug, or public order offenses”); Christopher Ingraham,
Why We Spend Billions to Keep Half a Million Unconvicted People Behind Bars, WASH. POST
(June 11, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/06/11/why-we-spendbillions-to-keep-half-a-million-unconvicted-people-behind-bars/?utm_term=.7b0504b1c208
[https://perma.cc/RP4B-F5S8] (“[P]eople sit behind bars not because they’re dangerous, or
because they’re a flight risk, but simply because they can’t come up with the cash.”).
14 See Lorelei Laird, Court Systems Rethink the Use of Financial Bail, Which Some
Say Penalizes the Poor, AM. B. ASS’N J. (Apr. 2016), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/
courts_are_rethinking_bail [https://perma.cc/RK2D-56FB] (“By conditioning freedom on the
ability to pay, they say, bail systems needlessly imprison poor defendants who pose no threat.
Meanwhile, wealthy people go free regardless of what danger they might pose.”).
15 See infra Part II.
16 Cassie Miller, The Two-Tiered Justice System: Money Bail in Historical
Perspective, S. POVERTY L. CTR. (June 6, 2017), https://www.splcenter.org/20170606/two-tieredjustice-system-money-bail-historical-perspective [https://perma.cc/R392-XF5M] (“For their
crime of poverty, they pay in lost income, employment, and time with their families. They are
more likely to plead guilty in order to avoid pretrial detention.”).
17 See id.
18 See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in
African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1272–73 (2004) (“African Americans
experience a uniquely astronomical rate of imprisonment, and the social effects of imprisonment
are concentrated in their communities.”); Aida Chávez, Bernie Sanders Introduces Bill to End
Money Bail, INTERCEPT (July 25, 2018, 1:30 PM), https://theintercept.com/2018/07/25/berniesanders-money-bail/ [https://perma.cc/7DU7-LAJC].
19 PATRICK LIU ET AL., HAMILTON PROJECT, THE ECONOMICS OF BAIL AND
PRETRIAL DETENTION 13 (2018), http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/BailFine
Reform_EA_121818_6PM.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZL5N-YZCH].
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States, in turn, have responded to these expenses by slashing funds
to other programs, including higher education.20
The inequities and costs of cash bail have not gone
unnoticed, as states like New Jersey, Philadelphia, California,
and New York have all taken steps to end or reform the cash bail
system.21 As of 2018, California became the first state to
statutorily eliminate money bail,22 but its risk assessment tool—
a tool many jurisdictions use in lieu of cash bail—poses troubling
consequences.23 Risk assessment tools are of questionable efficacy
and their use can potentially perpetuate racial inequities. Other
non-financial alternatives, like electronic monitoring, pose
similar problems and ignore the fundamental presumption of
innocence pretrial defendants should be afforded.24
The inhumane system of cash bail should not be replaced
with troubling alternatives. Although alternatives like California’s
risk assessment tools and electronic monitoring are steps in the right
direction, these alternatives still pose some of the same problems
associated with cash bail. One example of an alternative procedure
that has solved some of these problems is Washington, D.C.’s
pretrial system, where cash bail has essentially been eliminated and
replaced.25 D.C.’s success can be traced to its strong presumption
20 Shima Baradaran Baughman, Costs of Pretrial Detention, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1,
2, 2n.4 (2017).
21 The New Jersey Criminal Justice Reform Act has nearly eliminated any reliance
on cash bail, while Philadelphia District Attorney Larry Krasner has ended cash bail
requirements for low-level offenses. California was the first state to statutorily eliminate the use
of cash bail in the summer of 2018. See TCR Staff, As Federal Bail Reform Stalls, States and
Cities Act, CRIME REP. (July 26, 2018), https://thecrimereport.org/2018/07/26/as-federal-bailreform-stalls-states-and-cities-act/ [https://perma.cc/97S2-YPNH]; Vanessa Romo, California
Becomes First State to End Cash Bail After 40-Year Fight, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Aug. 28, 2018,
10:49 PM ET), https://www.npr.org/2018/08/28/642795284/california-becomes-first-state-to-endcash-bail [https://perma.cc/N2R6-D52U]. On April 1, 2019, New York eliminated cash bail for
the majority of misdemeanors and non-violent felonies. The bail reform law is set to go into effect
in January of 2020. Julie McMahon, New York Ends Cash Bail for Most: What it Means for
People Charged with a Crime, SYRACUSE.COM (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.syracuse.com/news/
2019/04/new-york-ends-cash-bail-for-most-what-it-means-for-people-charged-with-a-crime.
html [https://perma.cc/6BXV-X7MK].
22 Romo, supra note 21. While California was technically the first state to
eliminate cash bail, Washington D.C. effectively eliminated the use of financial constraints
in its criminal system in 1991. See Ann E. Marimow, When It Comes to Pretrial Release,
Few Other Jurisdictions Do It D.C.’s Way, WASH. POST (July 4, 2016), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/when-it-comes-to-pretrial-release-few-otherjurisdictions-do-it-dcs-way/2016/07/04/8eb52134-e7d3-11e5-b0fd-073d5930a7b7_story
.html?utm_term=.6401416b0d6d/ [https://perma.cc/KVR8-FAWP].
23 See Note, Bail Reform and Risk Assessment: The Cautionary Tale of Federal
Sentencing, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1125, 1132 (2018) [hereinafter Bail Reform] (noting the
substantial criticism leveled at risk assessment tools for their inaccuracy and dependence
on racially biased data); infra Section III.A.
24 See infra Part III for discussion on the drawbacks of relying on electronic
monitoring and risk assessment tools.
25 See Marimow, supra note 22.
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towards release, procedural protections for pretrial defendants, and
more humane pretrial services.26 This system, however successful,
still imposes some onerous pretrial restrictions and employs a risk
assessment tool that utilizes racially biased socioeconomic inputs.27
State legislatures should take the successful framework of
Washington, D.C.’s pretrial system one step further by releasing
misdemeanor defendants on personal recognizance and providing
greater procedural protections for felony defendants. The efforts
of community bail funds across America have shown that a vast
majority of defendants will return to court if adequately notified,
exemplifying that pretrial restrictions are unnecessary punitive
measures.28 By releasing all misdemeanor pretrial defendants
and ensuring adequate procedural protections for felony
defendants, states can restore some semblance of humanity to our
criminal justice system.
This note proceeds in the following four parts. Part I presents
a brief history of cash bail and an overview of current pretrial
practices. Part II addresses the importance of eliminating cash bail
by showing the disastrous effects that the system can have on
individuals, indigent and minority defendants, and the U.S.
economy. Part III discusses two of the more popular alternatives to
cash bail—risk assessments and electronic monitoring—and
illustrates that these two alternatives pose equally troubling
consequences as that of cash bail. Part IV offers the solution to
ending cash bail: state legislatures should adopt bail reform laws
that release misdemeanor pretrial defendants and restore adequate
procedural protections for felony defendants.
I.

HISTORY OF CASH BAIL AND CURRENT PRACTICES

The present problem of cash bail can be traced back to the
passage of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 and its reversal of decades
of progressive bail reform.29 The Supreme Court’s decision in
United States v. Salerno, upholding the constitutionality of the Act,
further aided the proliferation of the current cash bail system in
the United States and helped contribute to the incarceration of

26 See COLIN DOYLE ET AL., HARV. L. SCH. CRIM. JUST. POL’Y PROGRAM, BAIL REFORM:
A GUIDE FOR STATE AND LOCAL POLICYMAKERS 35–38 (Feb. 2019), http://cjpp.law.harvard.edu/
assets/BailReform_WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LAK-PBSQ].
27 See id.; infra Section III.A.
28 See, e.g., FAQ: What Should Replace Cash Bail?, BAIL PROJECT, https://bail
project.org/faq/ [https://perma.cc/LJC3-TZW3] (noting that “[ninety-five percent] of [Bail
Project] clients have returned for all their court dates, despite not having any of their own
money on the line.”).
29 See infra Section I.B
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millions of pretrial defendants.30 Before addressing the history of
cash bail, this note provides a brief overview of the bail process.
A.

Basics of Bail

Bail laws vary state to state, but at a basic level, a person
who is arrested is entitled to pretrial release except in a few rare
cases.31 A judge can release a pretrial defendant on personal
recognizance (a promise to return to court), with conditions (i.e.,
electronic monitoring, drug testing, and/or pretrial service
supervision), or on bail.32 If a pretrial defendant is not released on
personal recognizance, the court generally must justify the
outcome with “a finding of a significant risk that the defendant will
not appear at future court appearances or will commit a serious
crime in the community during the pretrial period.”33
A pretrial defendant can be released on bail pursuant to a
secured or unsecured bond. An unsecured bond does not require
an upfront payment for release, but if a defendant misses
subsequent court dates he or she will owe the court money.34
Secured bonds require the pretrial defendant to pay his or her
bond amount first before securing release.35 The amount of money
the court requires the defendant to pay “as a condition of his
release is that person’s cash bail or money bail.”36 In some cases,
a defendant can secure release by paying ten percent of the total
bond amount directly to the court. In those cases, if the defendant
makes their subsequent court appearances, the court will often
return the ten percent amount.37 But in most instances, when a
defendant cannot afford to pay the bond set by the court, he or she
must turn to a bail bonds agent. The agent, or surety, will make
the payment for the pretrial defendant through a “surety bond.”38
If a defendant cannot afford the bail amount, “either personally
or through a surety, they will remain incarcerated based on their
inability to pay the money bail.”39
30 See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 741 (1987); James A. Allen, “Making
Bail”: Limiting the Use of Bail Schedules and Defining the Elusive Meaning of “Excessive”
Bail, 25 J.L. & POL’Y 637, 652–53 (2017) (noting that after Salerno pretrial detention rates
increased because states amended their bail statutes to allow for more arrestees to be
detained based on future dangerousness).
31 See Bail Reform, supra note 23, at 1126–27.
32 Id. at 1127.
33 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, HARVARD LAW SCH., MOVING BEYOND
MONEY: A PRIMER ON BAIL REFORM 5 (2016) [hereinafter BAIL PRIMER].
34 Id. at 6.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Rabuy & Kopf, supra note 10, at 1 n.6.
39 BAIL PRIMER, supra note 33, at 6.
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History of Cash Bail

The current cash bail system is deeply rooted in English
law.40 When the United States declared its independence, English
law on pretrial detention had three elements: (1) a determination
if a defendant had the right to be released on bail;41 (2) a habeas
corpus procedure; and (3) protection against excessive bail.42
Initially, the American colonies embraced nearly all of England’s
bail practices, with some slight differences.43 But cultural and
social differences in beliefs about criminal justice, crime rates,
and colonial customs led to a more liberal criminal penalty law in
the American colonies.44 For example, Pennsylvania, which
served as “the model for almost every state constitution adopted
after 1776,” provided that nearly all prisoners shall be bailable
with certain exceptions for capital offenses.45
Contributing to the progressive bail policies of the
American colonies was the embrace of the English bail tradition of
personal sureties.46 Sureties “were unpaid and unreimbursed,” and
merely required a “promise[] to pay . . . in the event of default.”47 In
fact, personal sureties and promises to pay were the foundation of
the bail system adopted in the American colonies.48
The theoretical underpinning of these protections was
“grounded in the presumption of innocence, an ‘axiomatic and
elementary’ right to protect defendants prior to any finding of
guilt.”49 The United States Constitution eventually codified
these pretrial detainee protections in both the Eighth
40 See Kelly Allen, The Evolution of Money Bail Throughout History, BURNS INST.
(Apr. 18, 2016), https://www.burnsinstitute.org/blog/the-evolution-of-money-bail-throughouthistory/ [https://perma.cc/V3NK-D287].
41 This was “answered by the Petition of Right,” which contained “a long line of
statutes which spelled out which cases must and which must not be bailed by justices of
the peace or (in the early period) by sheriffs, and by the discretionary power of the judges
of the king’s bench to bail any case not bailable by the lower judiciary.” TIMOTHY R.
SCHNACKE ET AL., PRETRIAL JUST. INST., THE HISTORY OF BAIL AND PRETRIAL RELEASE 4
[hereinafter THE HISTORY OF BAIL] (Sept. 24, 2010), https://b.3cdn.net/crjustice/2b990da
76de40361b6_rzm6ii4zp.pdf [https://perma.cc/MP7G-WMJF].
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.; see also TIMOTHY R. SCHNACKE, CTR. LEGAL & EVIDENCE-BASED PRAC.,
‘MODEL BAIL LAWS’: RE-DRAWING THE LINE BETWEEN PRETRIAL RELEASE AND DETENTION
21 (Apr. 18, 2017) (noting America expanded the right to release to nearly all defendants
and associated release “with liberty and freedom”).
45 THE HISTORY OF BAIL, supra note 41, at 4–5 (quoting June Carbone, Seeing
Through the Emperor’s New Clothes: Rediscovery of Basic Principles in the Administration of
Bail, 34 SYRACUSE L. REV. 517, 532 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
46 Timothy R. Schnacke, A Brief History of Bail, 57 JUDGES’ J. 4, 6 (2018).
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Crystal S. Yang, Toward an Optimal Bail System, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1399,
1411 (2017) (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 454 (1895)).

1428

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:4

Amendment’s Excessive Bail Clause and the Judiciary Act of
1789.50 These doctrinal protections remained the norm for nearly
the next two centuries.51
In the 1800s, American bail practices started to change
because personal sureties were no longer willing to take
responsibility over defendants without payment.52 American judges
“began placing secured money conditions on defendants hoping they
could ‘self-pay.’”53 When defendants were unable to pay their bail
amounts, they asserted that the amounts were excessive. But
American courts began claiming “that an amount was not excessive
simply because it was unattainable.”54 As other countries began to
also grapple with the loss of personal sureties, “America acted
alone . . . when, in roughly 1900, it began allowing commercial
sureties by gradually discarding the longstanding rules against
profit and indemnification at bail.”55 Around this time, most courts
began requiring secured conditions, or full payment of bail rather
than a promise to pay, as a condition of release.56 This increased use
of commercial sureties became problematic as large inequities
between those who could afford release and those who could not
became apparent.57
During the 1960s, it appeared that Americans were
rethinking the cash bail system and charting a course towards a
more just pretrial procedure.58 At that time, cash bail was thrust
into the national spotlight as legislatures and the courts
questioned the effectiveness of secured financial conditions.59 In
50 See U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“Excessive bail shall not be required . . . .”); Stack
v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (“From the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789 . . . federal
law has unequivocally provided that a person arrested for a noncapital offense shall be
admitted to bail.” (emphasis in original)).
51 Yang, supra note 49, at 1411.
52 Schnacke, supra note 46, at 6.
53 Id.
54 Id. (quoting TIMOTHY R. SCHNACKE, MONEY AS A CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STAKEHOLDER: THE JUDGE’S DECISION TO RELEASE OR DETAIN A DEFENDANT PRETRIAL, at n.73
& accompanying text (Nat’l Inst. of Corrections 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
55 Id. at 7.
56 Id.
57 Allen, supra note 40.
58 Robert Kennedy, then acting U.S. Attorney General, exemplified this reformminded era when he stated: “‘usually only one factor determines whether a defendant stays
in jail before trial.’ ‘That factor is not guilt or innocence. It is not the nature of the crime. It
is not the character of the defendant. That factor simply is money.’” Kennedy Scores Bail
Injustices; Changes in System Urged by the Attorney General, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 1964),
https://www.nytimes.com/1964/05/30/archives/kennedy-scores-bail-injustices-changes-insystem-urged-by-the.html [https://perma.cc/XH93-TTEY].
59 See John S. Goldkamp, Danger and Detention: A Second Generation of Bail
Reform, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 2, 2 n.7 (1985) (listing reform efforts by legislatures,
non-profits, and the courts in the 1960s); see also Caleb Foote, Compelling Appearance in
Court: Administration of Bail in Philadelphia, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1071 (1954) (“The only
resolution of the clash between bail and defendants’ rights is to abandon the necessity of bail
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response to the growing criticism directed at the efficacy of cash
bail and the increasingly large bail amounts judges discretionally
imposed, Congress passed the Bail Reform Act of 1966.60 The Act
attempted to reform America’s criticized bail system by creating a
presumption towards release for all non-capital defendants.61
Furthermore, if a judge believed that release on recognizance
would be inadequate in assuring the pretrial detainee’s appearance
at trial, the judge was to choose the least restrictive alternative
condition.62 Only those charged with capital offenses were given a
different standard of release, a standard that factored in a
defendants potential danger to the community.63
Many states began to emulate the Bail Reform Act’s
provisions, some going as far as relying solely on personal promises
rather than financial conditions.64 In the culmination of this
reform-minded era, professional organizations issued standards in
relation to bail issues at a national level.65 The American Bar
Association (ABA), for example, attacked the bail system’s
emphasis on financial constraints stating that the proposition “that
risk of financial loss is necessary to prevent defendants from fleeing
prosecution . . . is itself of doubtful validity.”66
Despite impressive beginnings, these reforms began
waning and many of the release on recognizance programs ceased
operating or barely operated due to shaky financial and official
support.67 Initially, the sole congressional standard for assessing
bail was set forth for the purpose of deterring a defendant’s risk

for defendants who are financially unable to obtain it, and if society can afford to take this
risk with indigents, it can take it with all defendants.”).
60 Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214. The legislative
history of the act explicitly stated the problems of the cash-centered bail system: “The
present system of monetary bail would be adequate if all could afford it. The facts, however,
are to the contrary. The rich man and the professional criminal readily raise bail regardless
of the amount. But it is the poor man, lacking sufficient funds, who remains incarcerated
prior to trial.” H. REP. NO. 89-1541 (1966) reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2293, 2299.
61 See Bail Reform Act of 1966, 80 Stat. at 214; THE HISTORY OF BAIL, supra
note 41, at 12.
62 Id.
63 THE HISTORY OF BAIL, supra note 41, at 12; see also Calaway & Kinsley,
supra note 4, at 800–01.
64 See THE HISTORY OF BAIL, supra note 41, at 12–13.
65 See PA. COMM. FOR CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS & GOALS, THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STANDARDS AND GOALS OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION DIGESTED FROM A
NATIONAL STRATEGY TO REDUCE CRIME 53 (1973) (“The Commission believes that a person’s
financial resources should not determine whether he is detained prior to trial.”); AM. B. ASS’N
CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS COMM., ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PRETRIAL RELEASE
31 (3d ed. 2007) (“[T]he bail system as it now generally exists is unsatisfactory from either the
public’s or the defendant’s point of view.”).
66 AM. B. ASS’N CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS COMM., supra note 65, at 31.
67 THE HISTORY OF BAIL, supra note 41, at 16.
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of flight.68 In fact, the 1966 Bail Reform Act “did not expressly
permit a judge to consider the defendant’s future dangerousness
or community safety during the release decision” for non-capital
offenses.69 But, as with many rash restrictions on liberty, the
death knell for bail reform was ushered in under the banner of
law and order and racially-charged rhetoric.70
The Nixon administration first attempted to strike
against the Bail Reform Act of 1966 by unsuccessfully lobbying
for an amendment to allow for preventative detention; in other
words, allowing a judge to consider a defendant’s potential
danger to the community in setting bail.71 Congressional
compromise led to the passage of the District of Columbia Court
Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, which expressly
allowed D.C. to put community safety on equal footing with risk
of flight in setting a bail amount.72
Due to highly publicized violent crimes committed by
released pretrial defendants and growing public dissatisfaction
with crime, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Crime Control
Act of 1984, which included the Bail Reform Act of 1984.73 The Act
amended the Bail Reform Act of 1966 to include dangerousness to
the community as a factor in assessing bail due to “the alarming
problem of crimes committed by persons on release.”74 The 1984 Act
contained numerous provisions that helped lead to the current
system.75 First, the Act allowed a judge to exercise even more
68 Id. at 14. “It must be remembered that under American criminal
jurisprudence pretrial bail may not be used as a device to protect society from the
possible commission of additional crimes by the accused.” H. REP. NO. 89-1541 (1966)
reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2293, 2296.
69 THE HISTORY OF BAIL, supra note 41, at 14.
70 See Calaway & Kinsley, supra note 4, at 804 (“As calls to get ‘tough on crime’
came from both the Reagan Administration and the public, judges responded by setting
high financial bonds for pretrial defendants.” (citing Keith Swisher, Pro-Prosecution
Judges: “Tough on Crime,” Soft on Strategy, Ripe for Disqualification, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 317,
364–66 (2010)); see also ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON
CRIME: THE MAKING OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 165–66 (2016) (noting the shift
from a rehabilitation minded justice system to one focused on punitive measures).
71 Samuel Wiseman, Discrimination, Coercion, and the Bail Reform Act of 1984:
The Loss of the Core Constitutional Protections of the Excessive Bail Clause, 36 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 121, 135, 139 (2009).
72 District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473; Albert W. Alschuler, Preventive Pretrial Detention and the
Failure of Interest-Balancing Approaches to Due Process, 85 MICH. L. REV. 510, 512 (1986).
73 See Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–3150 (2012 & Supp. V 2018)); THE HISTORY OF BAIL, supra note 41, at 17.
74 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 742 (1987) (quoting S. REP. NO. 98–
225, at 3 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
75 For example, every defendant charged with a felony drug offense is subject to
detention. See Thomas E. Scott, Pretrial Detention Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984: An
Empirical Analysis, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 33 (1989). This is especially problematic
considering that the “war on drugs” has had a disparate impact on African Americans, who
as a group are targeted and arrested by police officers for non-violent drug offenses at a higher
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discretion than the 1966 Act by expressly allowing consideration of
community safety in deciding whether to detain a pretrial
defendant.76 This increased discretion can be problematic when one
considers a judiciary that is often out of step with the jurisdiction
they preside over and the inherent racial biases, be it implicit or
explicit, against minority defendants.77 Furthermore, the idea that
“future dangerousness” can be accurately predicted is widely
considered to be false in both the science and psychiatry
community.78 Second, “the Act create[d] a rebuttable presumption
toward confinement when the person has committed certain
delineated offenses, such as crimes of violence or serious drug
crimes.”79 The list of drug offenses satisfying the “serious drug
crime” category had the effect of disproportionately imprisoning
minority defendants.80 Lastly, the Act provided defendants with
minimal procedural protections from the prosecutors seeking to
confine them:
[T]he Act contains little to balance out the reliance on predicting
dangerousness for the defense side. Evidence of other crimes may be

rate than any other race. See andré douglas pond cummings, “All Eyez on Me”: America’s War
on Drugs and the Prison-Industrial Complex, 15 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 417, 418 (2012).
Furthermore, while detention of minorities for soft drug crimes has been increasing since the
1970s, violent crime rates have decreased over the last two decades. Michael Tonry, Why Are
U.S. Incarceration Rates So High?, 45 CRIME & DELINQ. 419, 422–23 (1999).
76 Bail Reform Act of 1984, 98 Stat. at 1977 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3142(c) (2012 & Supp. V 2018)).
77 See TRACEY E. GEORGE & ALBERT H. YOON, AM. CONST. SOC’Y L. & POL’Y, THE
GAVEL GAP: WHO SITS IN JUDGMENT ON STATE COURTS?, at 3 (2016) (“People of color make
up roughly four in ten people in the country but fewer than two in ten judges; and, in sixteen
states, judges of color account for fewer than one in ten state judges.”). Empirical evidence
has demonstrated that race and ethnic bias can contribute to disproportionate treatment
of minorities in the setting of bail, use of peremptory challenges, plea bargaining, and
obtaining adequate defense representation. Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 1, 47–48 (1994).
78 See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 920 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting
the American Psychiatric Association’s amicus curiae brief “[t]he unreliability of psychiatric
predictions of long-term future dangerousness is by now an established fact within the
profession.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Laura I. Appleman, Justice in the
Shadowlands: Pretrial Detention, Punishment, & the Sixth Amendment, 69 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1297, 1336 (2012) (discussing the theory of predicting future dangerous and noting “[b]oth
judges and academics have challenged the bases for this type of determination, however, putting
the entire theory to question”); Jack F. Williams, Process and Prediction: A Return to A Fuzzy
Model of Pretrial Detention, 79 MINN. L. REV. 325, 335 (1994) (stating that numerous courts and
legal commentators have recognized scientific studies that illustrate the unreliability of
predictions of future dangerousness).
79 Glossary of Terms and Phrases Relating to Bail and the Pretrial Release or
Detention Process, PRETRIAL JUST. INST. (2015); see Bail Reform Act of 1984, 98 Stat. at
1978–79 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(2) (2012 & Supp. V 2018)).
80 See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Who Locked Us Up? Examining the Social
Meaning of Black Punitiveness, 127 YALE L.J. 2388, 2400 (2018) (reviewing JAMES FORMAN,
JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA (2017)) (“As many
commentators have demonstrated, the ‘War on Drugs’ has severely impacted ‘low-income
African American communities.’”).
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presented as hearsay, which is not subject to cross-examination.
There is no notice to defendants that prosecutors may seek pretrial
detention based on prior crimes or behavior. Additionally, the 1984
Act does not require that there be any confrontation between the
defendant and the prosecutor who proffers the evidence.81

The Act survived a constitutional challenge in United
States v. Salerno, where the Supreme Court held that the Act
violated neither the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause nor
the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Bail Clause.82 As to the
respondent’s due process challenge, the Court held that Congress
had a compelling and legitimate interest in preventing danger to
the community.83 The Court grounded this ruling on the notion
that the congressional purpose in passing the Act was not to
punish pretrial defendants but instead the Act was a form of
regulation.84 The Court also minimized the respondent’s
contention that predictions of future dangerousness are
inaccurate, stating “there is nothing inherently unattainable
about a prediction of future criminal conduct.”85 In addressing the
respondent’s Eight Amendment contention, that the right to bail
should be calculated solely based on consideration of flight and
not future dangerousness, the Court held that nothing in the
Eighth Amendment precludes a court from considering factors
other than risk of flight.86
With that ruling, the Salerno Court solidified the
constitutionality of detention based on pretrial dangerousness,
a ruling that has since contributed to the imprisonment of
innumerable pretrial detainees.87 Justice Marshall eloquently
summed up the impact of the decision in his dissent:
Appleman, supra note 78, at 1331 (footnotes omitted).
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 741 (1987).
83 Id. at 752.
84 Id. at 747–48. Justice Marshall’s dissent highlighted this false dichotomy
when he stated “[t]he majority concludes that the Act is a regulatory rather than a punitive
measure. The ease with which the conclusion is reached suggests the worthlessness of the
achievement.” Id. at 759 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
85 Id. at 751 (majority opinion) (quoting Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 278
(1984) (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 920 (1983)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting the American Psychiatric Association’s amicus curiae
brief “[t]he unreliability of psychiatric predictions of long-term future dangerousness is by
now an established fact within the profession”); Williams, supra note 78, at 335.
86 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 752–53.
87 The Salerno decision, by ratifying a state’s ability to detain individuals based
on their potential dangerousness, led to an increase in the rate of pretrial incarceration.
See Allen, supra note 30, at 653 (noting that, after Salerno pretrial detention rates
increased because states amended their bail statutes to allow for more arrestees to be
detained based on future dangerousness). Furthermore, by rejecting the contention that
predicting future dangerousness is inaccurate, the Salerno decision helped contribute to
the pretrial detention of the innocent. See Michael J. Eason, Eight Amendment—Pretrial
Detention: What Will Become of the Innocent?, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1048, 1066
(1988) (Even those who favor some form of pretrial detention agree that “the risk of
81

82
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Throughout the world today there are men, women, and children
interned indefinitely, awaiting trials which may never come or which
may be a mockery of the word, because their governments believe
them to be “dangerous.” Our Constitution . . . . cannot protect us if we
lack the courage, and the self-restraint, to protect ourselves. Today a
majority of the Court applies itself to an ominous exercise in
demolition. Theirs is truly a decision which will go forth without
authority, and come back without respect.88

While States are free to fashion their own bail practices, these
practices must still adhere to a constitutional floor.89 Salerno allowed
this constitutional floor to include fear-based detention.
C.

Current Practices

After the passage of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 and the
Salerno decision, states began to adopt the federal position’s
emphasis on factoring in an individual’s dangerousness to the
community,90 effectively reversing any momentum from the
previous bail reform era.91 These state statutes reflected the
influence of tough on crime rhetoric92 and effectively increased the
use of pretrial incarceration.93 In essence, “nearly every state has
incorporated . . . two purposes for bail”: community safety and

erroneous detention under the Bail Reform Act [of 1984] is uncomfortably high.”); Craig
Ethan Allen, Case Note, Pretrial Detention and the Loss of Innocence, United States v.
Salerno, 11 HAMLINE L. REV. 331, 344–45 (1988) (due to the inaccuracy of predicting future
dangerousness, judges might err on the side of detention in close cases thereby “ensuring
a ‘larger number of erroneous confinements—that is, confinements of persons predicted to
engage in violent crime who would not, in fact, do so.’”) (quoting Alan M. Dershowitz, The
Law of Dangerousness: Some Fictions About Predictions, 23 J. LEGAL EDUC. 24, 32 (1970)).
88 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 767 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
89 See ALLISON M. SMITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LSB10220, STATE MONEYBAIL SYSTEMS: DIFFERING APPROACHES 2 (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/LSB10220.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4CPT-CQ9U].
90 These bail provisions have come to be known as “preventative detention” statutes.
Michael W. Youtt, Note, The Effect of Salerno v. United States on the Use of State Preventive
Detention Legislation: A New Definition of Due Process, 22 GA. L. REV. 805, 836 (1988).
91 THE HISTORY OF BAIL, supra note 41, at 18 (“By 1999, it was reported that at
least [forty-four] states and the District of Columbia had statutes that included public safety,
as well as risk of failure to appear, as an appropriate consideration in the pretrial release
decision.” (citing EVIE LOTZE ET AL., PRETRIAL SERVS. RES. CTR., THE PRETRIAL SERVICES
REFERENCE BOOK 12 (1999)).
92 See Calaway & Kinsley, supra note 4, at 804 (“Judges do not want to appear soft
on crime and are acutely aware that they may be held responsible if crimes are committed
during the pretrial period.”); Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on the Judiciary: Can Justice
Be Done Amid Efforts to Intimidate and Remove Judges from Office for Unpopular Decisions?,
72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 308, 320 (1997) (noting New York politicians often dole out criticism for bail
decisions adverse to the prosecution).
93 See SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 13, at 7 (“By every measure, the scale at
which jails operate has grown dramatically over the past three decades. The number of
annual admissions nearly doubled, from six million in 1983 to 11.7 million in 2013.”).
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flight risk.94 These standards typically make judges exercise
individual determinations based on factors like: “the nature and
circumstances of the offense charged, the weight of the evidence,
family ties, employment, financial resources, and character and
mental condition of the defendant.”95
Despite the Supreme Court’s emphasis on individual bail
determinations,96 many states have also adopted the bail schedule,
a procedural device that eradicates any sort of individualized inquiry
into a defendant.97 Bail schedules are guidelines that provide judges
with standardized bail amounts based solely on the offense charged,
thereby ignoring the individual characteristics of a defendant.98
These systems, which can be mandatory or merely advisory, usually
provide a minimum, maximum, “or a range of sums to be imposed
for each crime.”99 In one survey, sixty-four percent of county
respondents indicated that they utilized some form of a bail
schedule.100 The problem with uniformly imposing such bail
amounts is that these systems, in effect, operate to imprison pretrial
detainees often charged with low-level crimes.101
Driven by the injustice of cash bail, a new bail reform wave
is currently occurring, where many prosecutors, defense
attorneys, and judges agree that the system is ineffective and
needs to be replaced.102 Many alternatives to money bail have
been both proposed, and in some cases, adopted by states and
counties throughout the United States.103 In order to understand
94 See Lindsey Carlson, Bail Schedules: A Violation of Judicial Discretion?,
PRETRIAL JUST. INST. (Dec. 6, 2010), https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/
DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=b646a57f-6399-2fe4-5683-021480c3634a
[https://perma.cc/L8PZ-RY7V].
95 Id. (citing MINN. R. CRIM. P. 9.02; N.J. COURT RULES, R. 3:26-1; MONT. CODE
ANNO. § 46-9-109; WYO. R. CR .P. RULE 46.1 (2010)).
96 See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (holding that the calculation of bail “must
be based upon standards relevant to the purpose of assuring the presence of that defendant.
The traditional standards, as expressed in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, are to be
applied in each case to each defendant” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)).
97 Allen, supra note 30, at 641, 653–55.
98 Carlson, supra note 94.
99 Id.
100 PRETRIAL JUST. INST., PRETRIAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA: A SURVEY OF COUNTY
PRETRIAL RELEASE POLICIES, PRACTICES AND OUTCOMES 7 (2009), https://university.pretrial.
org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=d4c7feb2-55beccd0-f06a-02802f18eeee [https://perma.cc/7QQA-WPUX].
101 Jessica Brand & Jessica Pishko, Bail Reform: Explained, APPEAL (June 14,
2018), https://theappeal.org/bail-reform-explained-4abb73dd2e8a/ [https://perma.cc/5F4KW8GH] (“Often, those being held on bail have simply been accused of low-level offenses.
Seventy-five percent of pretrial detainees have been charged with only drug or property
crimes.”).
102 See BAIL PRIMER, supra note 33, at 4.
103 See Bryce Covert, America is Waking Up to the Injustice of Cash Bail, NATION
(Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/america-is-waking-up-to-the-injusticeof-cash-bail/ [https://perma.cc/W2PQ-QG6W] (noting the success of the Bail Reform Act in
D.C. and the replacement of cash bail with risk assessments in New Jersey and Kentucky).
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how these alternatives fall short of the mark, it is necessary to
first dive deeper into the effect the inability to afford bail can have
on a pretrial detainee’s life and on society as a whole.
II.

THE EFFECTS OF CASH BAIL

Pretrial detention, as a consequence of the inability to
afford bail, can have disastrous effects on an individual. Even an
imprisonment of “a few days . . . can increase the likelihood of a
sentence of incarceration and the harshness of that sentence,
reduce economic viability, promote future criminal behavior, and
worsen the health of those who enter.”104 The community-level
consequences to minority and indigent defendants are even more
abhorrent to any idea of justice, with an exceedingly
disproportionate incarceration rate of African Americans,
Hispanics, and poor defendants.105 Taken as a whole, these policies
of money bail have wreaked havoc on society from both a micro and
macro level, destroying the lives of individuals, overcrowding jails,
and seeking punishment over understanding.106 If a nation is to be
judged on how it treats its lowest citizens,107 then America has
hopelessly failed.
A.

Individual Costs: The Effect of Pretrial Detention on
Detainees

When a defendant is unable to post bail, often in relation to
a relatively minor crime,108 the adjudication of their criminal case is
drastically affected.109 For example, in a recent comprehensive study
of 153,407 defendants booked into a Kentucky jail, researchers found
that those defendants who are detained “for the entire pretrial
period are much more likely to be sentenced to jail and prison.”110

SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 13, at 5.
Demetria D. Frank, Prisoner to Public Communication, 84 BROOK. L. REV.
115, 116 n.6 (2018) (discussing the severe social consequences in the poor and minority
communities that suffer “disproportionally high incarceration rates”).
106 See infra Sections I.A., II.B.
107 See supra note 1.
108 See Brand & Pishko, supra note 101.
109 Pretrial detention increases both the likelihood of conviction and the length of
sentencing. See Cherise Fanno Burdeen, The Dangerous Domino Effect of Not Making Bail,
ATLANTIC (Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/04/the-dangerousdomino-effect-of-not-making-bail/477906/ [https://perma.cc/EJ2C-NF9W]; see also Christopher
T. Lowenkamp et al., Investigating the Impact of Pretrial Detention on Sentencing Outcomes,
ARNOLD FOUND. 4 (Nov. 2013), https://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/
LJAF_Report_state-sentencing_FNL.pdf [https://perma.cc/VL5W-26HW].
110 Lowenkamp et al., supra note 109.
104

105
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The study found that “[l]ow-risk defendants111 who were detained for
the entire pretrial period were 5.41 times more likely to be sentenced
to jail and 3.76 times more likely to be sentenced to prison,” in
comparison to those who were “released at some point before trial.”112
This disparity continued in terms of sentencing, as the study found
that defendants detained for the entire pretrial period were also
found to receive 2.78 times longer sentences than those defendants
released at some point during the pretrial period.113 These findings
are not individual to the Kentucky system, as many other studies
have similarly shown increased rates of conviction and sentence
times for defendants detained prior to trial.114 Furthermore, “[t]hese
effects of pretrial detention appear the same even after controlling
for factors such as the seriousness of the charges, prior convictions,
and evidence against the defendant.”115
Pretrial detention accounts for these disparate figures for
a myriad of reasons. First, pretrial detention hampers the
defendant’s ability to adequately formulate a defense.116 A
defendant imprisoned prior to trial has a reduced ability to
effectively interact with their defense attorney.117 This is because
the defendants are often imprisoned a great distance from the
court in which they are tried, which thereby reduces their ability

111 The study used “a research based and validated assessment tool” called the
Kentucky Pretrial Risk Assessment (KPRA). The KPRA used 12 risk factors (offense class,
criminal history, failure to appear, etc.) to categorize the sample size into three tiers: low
risk, moderate risk, and high risk. Id. at 8.
112 Id. at 4.
113 Id. at 14.
114 See Arpit Gupta et al., The Heavy Costs of High Bail: Evidence from Judge
Randomization, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 471, 498 (2016) (“Defendants assessed money bail have a
6-percentage-point (12 percent) higher chance of conviction and a 0.7-percentage-point higher
yearly probability of being charged with further crimes (or a 6–9 percent increase) [in
Philadelphia jails].”); Megan T. Stevenson, Distortion of Justice: How the Inability to Pay Bail
Affects Case Outcomes, 34 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 511, 532 (2018) (finding a 6.2% increase in
likelihood of conviction for pretrial detainees); Miller, supra note 16.
115 Jeffrey Manns, Liberty Takings: A Framework for Compensating Pretrial
Detainees, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1947, 1972–73 (2005); cf STEVENS H. CLARKE ET AL., THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF BAIL SYSTEMS: AN ANALYSIS OF FAILURE TO APPEAR IN COURT AND
REARREST WHILE ON BAIL 36 (1976) (study that notes that it would not be desirable to
remove the financial incentives of cash bail if the amount is set in relation to the
seriousness of the crime charged).
116 See Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right to Be Monitored, 123
YALE L.J. 1344, 1355–56 (2014) (“The defendant must recruit friends or family members to
collect evidence and witnesses and will often have difficulty communicating with his
attorney due to limited visiting hours.”); Will Dobbie et al., The Effects of Pretrial Detention
on Conviction, Future Crime, and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges,
108 AM. ECON. REV. 201, 234 (2018) (“[I]t is also possible that pretrial release affects a
defendant’s ability to prepare an adequate defense or negotiate a settlement with
prosecutors. For example, a defendant may have a harder time gathering exculpatory
evidence if he is detained.”).
117 Wiseman, supra note 116, at 1355.
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to communicate with counsel.118 Additionally, pretrial detention
can interfere with the ability to even gain effective counsel in the
first place; incarceration can result in financial hardship,
leading to a “[lower] likelihood of obtaining private counsel.”119
Another factor contributing to the disproportionate
sentencing rate for pretrial detainees is the pretrial detainee’s
guilty plea, culminating from a desire to secure a quicker release.120
Pretrial detainees are frequently imprisoned in substandard local
and municipal jails, where conditions are often harsher than the
prisons housing those actually convicted of a crime.121 These
facilities are typically “locally operated jails where resources are
scarce[], the staff is ‘less professionalized,’ classification of inmates
is haphazard, and rapid turnover makes for generally chaotic
conditions.”122 Faced with the prospect of continuing to be jailed in
often subhuman conditions,123 losing their employment,124 and
risking being labeled a convict in the eyes of a jury,125 defendants
who cannot afford bail will often be compelled to plead guilty to
avoid additional jail time.126
118 See Douglas J. Klein, Note, The Pretrial Detention “Crisis”: The Causes and
the Cure, 52 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 281, 294 (1997).
119 See Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L.
REV. 497, 555 (2012).
120 See Dobbie et al., supra note 116, at 234 (“[I]t is possible that pretrial release
decreases a defendant’s incentive to plead guilty to obtain a faster release from jail.”); Covert,
supra note 103 (“Those who are detained before trial are far more likely to plead guilty—a
desperate attempt to regain their freedom, even if temporarily.”).
121 See Benjamin v. Fraser, 343 F.3d 35, 52–56 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting inadequate
ventilation, lighting, heating, and food contaminated with vermin and fecal matter in New
York jails); Owens v. Scott Cty. Jail, 328 F.3d 1026, 1026 (8th Cir. 2003) (defendant, who
shared a one-man cell with another inmate, had urine splashed on him and his blankets
when cellmate used bathroom); see also Appleman, supra note 78, at 1312; David C. Gorlin,
Note, Evaluating Punishment in Purgatory: The Need to Separate Pretrial Detainees’
Conditions-of-Confinement Claims from Inadequate Eighth Amendment Analysis, 108
MICH. L. REV. 417, 418–19 (2009) (“One court has colorfully invoked the biblical notion of
‘purgatory’ to describe the condition of those persons held by the government prior to a
formal adjudication of guilt.” (citing Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 933 (9th Cir. 2004))).
122 Gorlin, supra note 121, at 419.
123 Jail buildings can contain “mold, poor ventilation, lead pipes, and asbestos,” “a
vector of contagious diseases,” and some jails even house “low-level detainees with dangerous
convicted felons.” Appleman, supra note 78, at 1318, 1321.
124 See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (“Pretrial confinement may imperil
the suspect’s job, interrupt his source of income, and impair his family relationships.”); Nick
Pinto, The Bail Trap, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/
16/magazine/the-bail-trap.html [https://perma.cc/H5EG-Y7BH] (noting that missing one day of
work for some people can result in losing their job, housing, and disrupt family ties).
125 See Brett Snider, Can an Orange Jumpsuit Prejudice a Jury, FINDLAW
BLOTTER (May 7, 2014), https://blogs.findlaw.com/blotter/2014/05/can-an-orange-jail-jump
suit-prejudice-a-jury.html [https://perma.cc/GKT2-JBZB] (“It may not surprise you, but
how a criminal defendant appears before a jury is incredibly important in trial.”); Yang,
supra note 49, at 1419 (“[I]f detained defendants appear at arraignment and at trial in
shackles, prosecutors and jurors may be biased in favor of finding the defendant guilty and
sentencing a defendant to prison time.”).
126 See Yang, supra note 49, at 1419.
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Pretrial detention has an even more significant impact on
minorities. It is well established that the criminal justice system
has disparately impacted racial minorities in the United States.127
Consequences of incarceration are felt the most strongly in
African American and Latino communities, whose members are
disproportionately jailed in comparison to the rest of the
population.128 Despite African Americans and Latinos only
making up thirty percent of the general population, they
constitute fifty-one percent of the population in American jails.129
Local differences in the rate of detention can be even starker; in
New York City alone “blacks are jailed at nearly [twelve] times
the rate of whites and Latinos more than five times the rate of
whites.”130 A plethora of factors accounts for these inequitable
figures including police practices in low-income minority
communities, disadvantages minorities face in the court system,
and disproportionate pretrial detention figures.131
Cash bail perpetuates these disparities because a minority
defendant is less likely to be able to afford bail than a white
defendant, due in part, to the well-established linkages between
wealth and race.132 Even though bail amounts are similar for both
defendants, minority defendants are locked in a cyclical system of
disadvantage.133 Higher rates of incarceration amongst minority
defendants leads to higher rates of unemployment.134 Because
police practices target minority neighborhoods, these defendants
127 See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE
OF COLORBLINDNESS 2 (rev. ed., 2012); Andrew Kahn & Chris Kirk, There’s Blatant Inequality at
Nearly Every Phase of the Criminal Justice System, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 9, 2015), https://

www.businessinsider.com/theres-blatant-inequality-at-nearly-every-phase-of-the-criminal-justicesystem-2015-8 [https://perma.cc/C4K7-D78S]; SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 13, at 11.
128 African American and Latino defendants are less likely to afford bail and more
likely to be incarcerated than white defendants. BAIL PRIMER, supra note 33, at 7.
129 SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 13, at 15.
130 Id. at 11.
131 See id. at 15; JENNIFER FRATELLO ET AL., VERA INST. JUST., COMING OF AGE WITH
STOP AND FRISK: EXPERIENCES, PERCEPTIONS, AND PUBLIC SAFETY IMPLICATIONS 3 (Sept. 2013),
https://www.vera.org/publications/coming-of-age-with-stop-and-frisk-experiences-self-perceptionsand-public-safety-implications [https://perma.cc/7HJF-F3KS] (highlighting the disproportionate
impact of stop and frisk policies on minorities, especially on young black males).
132 The racial disparities in pre-incarceration wealth for those who cannot make bail
is telling. The Prison Policy Initiative found that African American males who are unable to
afford bail have a pre-incarceration income of $11,275, while white males have a preincarceration income of $18,283. Among non-incarcerated people the difference is still sharp.
Black males have an income of $31,284, while their white counter-parts have an income of
$43,560. RABUY & KOPF, supra note 10, at 2.
133 See Jean Bonhomme, African-American Males in the United States Prison
System: Impact on Family and Community, 3 J. MEN’S HEALTH & GENDER 223, 225 (2006)
(noting factors like racism, lack of job opportunities, and class discrimination “create a vicious
cycle that frequently relegates serial offenders to a permanently marginalized status”).
134 See Roberts, supra note 18, at 1293 (“[I]incarceration depletes black communities
of their workforce and income, thereby impairing their economic stability.”).

2019]

GIVE ME LIBERTY

1439

are often rearrested and, due to their inability to afford bail,
incarcerated.135 Furthermore, much of the growth in jails has been
attributed to an increased emphasis on drug enforcement.136 Black
men are arrested at disproportionate rates for drug possession,
despite similar rates of drug usage to white, and therefore are even
more likely to land in jail.137
Finally, a system that predicates freedom on wealth is
bound to destroy the lives of many indigent defendants, even
when discounting the impact of race. Though figures vary, the
Bureau of Justice Statistics places the median bail amount for a
felony offense to be around $10,000.138 Defendants unable to meet
bail have overall income levels drastically lower than nonincarcerated people.139 Sixty percent of individuals who are
unable to afford bail fall into the poorest third of society, while
eighty percent fall into the bottom half of society.140 Thus, in
operating a system where wealth buys freedom and poverty
equals imprisonment, we have condemned and forgotten a
troubling number of individuals. A true lost generation.
B.

Social Costs

As if money bail’s effect on individuals, families, and
communities is not distressing enough, the system also places a
burdensome toll on society as a whole.141 The increased rate of
135 For example, despite asserting they would not arrest individuals for low-level
marijuana possession, in the first three months of 2018 the NYPD made 4,081 arrests for
criminal possession of marijuana. Ninety-three percent of those arrested were people of color.
Innocence Staff, Racial Disparities Evident in New York City Arrest Data for Marijuana
Possession, INNOCENCE PROJECT (May 14, 2018), https://www.innocenceproject.org/racialdisparities-in-nyc-arrest-data-marijuana-possession/ [https://perma.cc/CDC6-PHTE]; see also
Roberts, supra note 18, at 1276 (“[A]nalysis shows not only that incarceration is persistently
concentrated in New York City’s poorest neighborhoods, but also that these neighborhoods
received more intensive and punitive police enforcement and parole surveillance throughout
a period of general decline in crime.”).
136 “From 1981 until 2006, when they peaked, total drug arrests more than tripled,
from 560,000 to 1.9 million, and the drug arrest rate (per 100,000) grew 160 percent. The
share of people in jail accused or convicted of a drug crime increased sharply in the 1980s . . . ”
SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 13, at 9.
137 “Although whites have a higher rate of illegal drug use, [sixty percent] of offenders
imprisoned for drug charges in 1998 were black.” Roberts, supra note 18, at 1275.
138 This $10,000 figure is based on national data from 2009. RABUY & KOPF, supra
note 10, at 1 n.9.
139 Id. at 2 (noting that defendants incarcerated due to their inability to make bail
have a median annual income of $15,109 prior to incarceration, which is forty-eight percent
lower than that of non-incarcerated individuals).
140 See id.
141 For example, the New York City Comptroller released a report stating that the
marginal cost to detain individuals before trial cost the city around $100 million annually. SCOTT
M. STRINGER, N.Y.C. DEP’T. COMPTROLLER, THE PUBLIC COST OF PRIVATE BAIL: A PROPOSAL TO
BAN BAIL BONDS IN NYC 5 (Jan. 17, 2018), https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/the-public-cost-ofprivate-bail-a-proposal-to-ban-bail-bonds-in-nyc/ [https://perma.cc/3Y32-NRAL].
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incarceration due to the inability to pay bail results in giant costs
to city or state budgets.142 For example, the ABA observed that the
cost to New York City, and consequently its taxpayers, was
$45,000 annually for housing a single pretrial detainee.143
Nationally, the United States Department of Justice had stated
that housing pretrial detainees costs taxpayers around $9 billion
dollars annually.144
The cost to society would be mitigated if the cash bail system
actually contributed to greater community safety, but the benefits of
the system are questionable at best.145 While it is certainly true that
jails hold some dangerous individuals accused of committing violent
crimes, “nearly [seventy-five] percent of the population of both
sentenced offenders and pretrial detainees are in jail for nonviolent
traffic, property, drug, or public order offenses.”146 In New York City,
for example, in roughly fifty percent of cases where a defendant was
imprisoned, the crime charged was a misdemeanor or less.147 Despite
the level of a violation, nearly every study conducted on money bail
has shown that its efficacy in keeping defendants from fleeing is
arguably non-existent. For instance, “[i]n the seventy-five largest
counties in the country, twenty-one to twenty-four percent of state
court felony defendants who were released on bail or personal
recognizance between 1990 and 2004 failed to appear at trial.”148
The sad irony of these detention consequences is that those
who should have been granted the presumption of innocence are
instead deemed guilty of the crime of being impoverished. Some are
forced to plead guilty to crimes they did not commit, while others
are punished too harshly for, what in many cases, amounts to a
lapse of judgment.149 The system itself is ineffective and costly, and
142 See Wiseman, supra note 116, at 1357 (“During the recent economic downturn,
the cost of money bail to society has been raised as a more practical rallying flag for reform.”).
143 Criminal Justice Section, State Policy Implementation Project, AM. B. ASS’N,
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/criminal_justice/spip_ha
ndouts.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/V433-NFCH].
144 Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Address at the National
Symposium on Pretrial Justice (June 1, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/
2011/ag-speech-110601.html [https://perma.cc/3LCG-84FQ].
145 For example, two years after New Jersey essentially ceased the use of cash bail
violent crime numbers had dropped by nearly thirty percent. Scott Shackford, Garden City
Crime is Down Since New Jersey Ditched Cash Bail, REASON (Dec. 6, 2018), https://
reason.com/blog/2018/12/06/crime-continues-to-decline-in-new-jersey [https://perma.cc/S7V7-V
XHK]; see also Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 119, at 502 (finding that if we released twentyfive percent of felony defendants pretrial there would be no increases in pretrial crime).
146 SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 13, at 5.
147 Id. In Los Angeles Jails, similarly, the biggest group of pretrial detainees were
those charged with minor crimes like traffic or vehicle related offenses. Id.
148 Wiseman, supra note 116, at 1361.
149 See Paul Heaton et al., The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor
Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 714 (2017) (due to the negative consequences of
pretrial detention “a detained person may plead guilty—even if innocent—simply to get out
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without question, is of little use in a society that prides itself on
justice. As Professor Laura Appleman of Willamette University
stated, “here, in the rotting jail cells of impoverished defendants—
still innocent before proven guilty—are the Shadowlands of
Justice: the murky corners of the criminal justice system, where
the lack of criminal procedure has produced a darkness unrelieved
by much scrutiny or concern on the part of the law.”150
III.

ALTERNATIVES ARE MORE OF THE SAME

There has been a growing movement to end the system of
cash bail at both a federal and state level.151 These reform methods,
though commendable in their recognition of the inefficacious
nature of cash bail, suffer from some of the same serious
deficiencies as cash bail. In crafting bail reform laws, state
legislatures should take care to avoid two of the more popular
methods of reform: (1) risk assessment tools; and (2) electronic
monitoring. Risk assessment tools are of questionable efficacy and
utilize racially biased data to predict risk, while electronic
monitoring is an onerous and unnecessary punitive measure.
A.

Risk Assessment Tools

In the summer of 2018, California became the first state to
fully eliminate cash bail.152 What drew much coverage was not the
obvious negative reaction of the bail bond industry, but the outcry
from the same activists who had originally advocated for the
elimination of the cash bail system.153 The anger stemmed from
of jail”); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1347 (2012) (noting
that the inability to afford bail and the potential deprivations associated with pretrial
detention “can create the perfect storm of wrongful pleas”); An Offer You Can’t Refuse: How
US Federal Prosecutors Force Drug Defendants to Plead Guilty, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
(Dec. 5, 2013), http://hrw.org/node/120933 [https://perma.cc/EBT7-LL7A] (illustrating the
“trial penalty,” where defendants who choose to go forgo a plea bargain face the risk of
excessive and severe sentences).
150 Appleman, supra note 78, at 1302.
151 See, e.g., Covert, supra note 103; Aiming for Fairness, Virginia City Puts Limits
on Cash Bail, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 8, 2019), https://wtop.com/virginia/2019/01/aiming-forfairness-virginia-city-puts-limits-on-cash-bail/ [https://perma.cc/859Q-XJV5] (reporting top
prosecutor in Norfolk, Virginia intends to end cash bail in most cases).
152 Madison Park, California Eliminates Cash Bail in Sweeping Reform, CNN (Aug. 28,
2018, 11:08 PM ET), https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/28/us/bail-california-bill/index.html [https://
perma.cc/95EQ-KSYE]. Washington, D.C. had essentially eliminated cash bail in the 90s. See Sabri
Ben-Achour, Washington D.C. Has Figured a Way Around Money Bail, MARKETPLACE (Oct. 21,
2016, 2:45 PM), https://www.marketplace.org/2016/10/21/wealth-poverty/washington-dc-hasfigured-out-way-around-money-bail [https://perma.cc/AAW7-QVCG]; Rachel Marshall, America’s
Bail System Is a War on the Poor. Let’s Get Rid of It., VOX (Aug. 24, 2016), https://www.vox.com/
2016/8/24/12590060/doj-bail-unconstitutional [https://perma.cc/QXG8-URMD].
153 See Laurel Eckhouse, California Abolished Money Bail. Here’s Why Bail Opponents
Aren’t Happy., WASH. POST (Aug. 31, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
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California’s replacement of cash bail with risk assessment tools, a
substitution that anti-bail advocates correctly felt perpetuates the
same racial disparities as the original system.154
Pretrial risk assessment tools utilize algorithms, eschewing
monetary standards, to predict a defendant’s risk of flight and
dangerousness to the community.155 These tools typically rely on
actuarial data and a checklist of risk factors “that statistically
correlate with nonappearance in court or commission of a crime
pretrial,” in order to “predict how likely it is that someone will miss
an upcoming court date or commit a crime before trial.”156
The most popular risk assessment tool, a result of
collaboration between the State of New Jersey and the Arnold
Foundation, is the Public Safety Assessment (PSA).157 The PSA uses
nine different risk factors: “age at current arrest, current violent
offense, pending charges, prior misdemeanor conviction, prior felony
conviction, prior violent conviction, prior failure to appear in past
two years, prior failure to appear older than two years, and prior
sentence to incarceration.”158 Based on these factors, a pretrial
defendant receives three scores on the following: failure to appear,
likelihood of new criminal activity, and likelihood of new violent
criminal activity.159 The scores have different banded categories,
representing the percentage chance that someone would flee,
commit a crime, or commit a violent crime.160 The scores themselves
do not warrant detention, but the judge and policymakers, in
analyzing the defendant’s scores, must decide whether the threshold
of risk warrants pretrial detention.161

cage/wp/2018/08/31/california-abolished-money-bail-heres-why-bail-opponents-arent-happy/
[https://perma.cc/P6AA-Y4FD].
154 See Jeremy B. White, California Ended Cash Bail. Why Are So Many Reformers
Unhappy About it?, POLITICO MAG. (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.politico.com/magazine/
story/2018/08/29/california-abolish-cash-bail-reformers-unhappy-219618 [https://perma.cc/K3X
V-93L4] (noting that reformists are against risk assessment tools due to their onerous release
requirements and racial biases); Ed Kilgore, California Abolishes Cash Bail Despite Criticism
from Left and Right, N.Y. INTELLIGENCER (Aug. 29, 2018), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/
2018/08/california-abolishes-cash-bail-despite-left-right-criticism.html [https://perma.cc/5GF9GZAW] (detailing criticism of California’s risk assessment tool including complaints that the
tools are biased against minority communities).
155 Richard F. Lowden, Risk Assessment Algorithms: The Answer to an
Inequitable Bail System?, 19 N.C.J.L. & TECH. 221, 229–31 (2018).
156 Bail Reform, supra note 23, at 1131.
157 LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT: RISK FACTORS
AND FORMULA 2 (2016).
158 Bail Reform, supra note 23, at 1131 (citing LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND.,
PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT: RISK FACTORS AND FORMULA 2 (2016)).
159 Id.
160 AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF N.J. ET AL., THE NEW JERSEY PRETRIAL JUSTICE
MANUAL 7 (2016).
161 Bail Reform, supra note 23, at 1132.
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The jurisdictional implementation of risk assessment tools
has not been wholly without success. New Jersey, for example,
saw its pretrial detention rate decline by nearly a third since it
adopted the PSA in 2017.162 Nonetheless, New Jersey’s success is
tempered by the shortcomings of the PSA in other jurisdictions.
In Lucas County, Ohio, for instance, the implementation of the
PSA actually led to an increase in pretrial detention rates.163
Kentucky, hailed as the “shining example” of risk assessment
success, has only seen “a small increase in the use of non-financial
bonds, and essentially no effect on releases, FTAs, pretrial crime,
or racial disparities in detention.”164
The mixed results of risk assessment tools are likely the
result of a series of factors. For one, determining what threshold of
risk warrants pretrial detention is a subjective determination that
varies amongst the risk assessment jurisdictions.165 Within the
PSA, New Jersey recommends pretrial detention only for arrestees
with the highest risk scores, which amounts to around five percent
of defendants.166 In contrast, Mecklenburg County, another PSA
user, recommends pretrial detention for all defendants except
those who are labeled “low or below-average.”167 If a jurisdiction
fails to calibrate the risk threshold for release to an equitable level,
then the change in pretrial detention rates could be negligible.
But even when risk rates are calibrated to promote pretrial
release, it is unclear whether the risk assessment system itself is
responsible for the pretrial release success. In New Jersey and
Kentucky, for instance, the risk assessment tool was just one small
part of their pretrial reform efforts.168 Both states expanded pretrial
services for defendants, increased the rate of cite and release,169 and
implemented other, educational, reforms.170 When jurisdictions
162 Megan T. Stevenson, Risk Assessment: The Devil’s in the Details, CRIME REP.
(Aug. 31, 2017), https://thecrimereport.org/2017/08/31/does-risk-assessment-work-theresno-single-answer/ [https://perma.cc/AB93-V6CR].
163 Id.
164 Megan Stevenson, Assessing Risk Assessment in Action, 103 MINN. L. REV.
303, 307, 310 (2018).
165 See id. at 316; Stevenson, supra note 162.
166 Stevenson, supra note 162
167 Id.
168 See John Raphling, Human Rights Watch Advises Against Using ProfileBased Risk Assessment in Bail Reform, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (July 17, 2017, 12:00 AM
EDT), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/17/humanrights-watch-advises-against-usingprofile-based-risk-assessment-bail-reform [https://perma.cc/FLB8-68N2]; see also Rachel
Smith, Condemned to Repeat History? Why the Last Movement for Bail Reform Failed,
and How This One Can Succeed, 25 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 451, 469 (2018).
169 Cite and release policies permit law enforcement officers to issue a citation
that “releases a person on a promise to appear in court or pay a fine.” Citation in Lieu of
Arrest, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (MAR. 18, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/
civil-and-criminal-justice/citation-in-lieu-of-arrest.aspx [https://perma.cc/N777-9SEM].
170 See Ralphing, supra note 168.
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adopted risk assessment tools as their only source of reform, in many
cases situations actually worsened: Harris County, Ohio, adopted
the PSA in place of cash bail, and “has seen increased rates of
pretrial detention and increased rates of early guilty pleas.”171 Apart
from the efficacy of risk assessment tools, the underlying risk score
calculation also proves problematic.
Risk assessment algorithms can serve as poor indicators
of future risk, and a jurisdiction utilizing such algorithms can
potentially perpetuate the same disparate treatment of minorities
that cash bail presently does.172 In 2016, Pro Publica conducted a
comprehensive study on risk assessment tools, obtaining the risk
scores assigned to over seven thousand defendants arrested in
Broward County, Florida.173 The study found that the scores had
little correlation with actually predicting the risks of letting a
pretrial defendant free. For example, only twenty percent of
defendants whose risk scores predicted they would commit violent
crimes actually committed such crimes. Even when taking into
account other crimes, including misdemeanors, “the algorithm
was somewhat more accurate than a coin flip,” only accurately
predicting future crime in sixty-one percent of the cases.174 A
recent study went as far as saying that risk assessment
algorithms are “no more accurate or fair than predictions made
by people with little or no criminal justice expertise.”175
Beyond the accuracy of the tools, many members of the
legal community have argued that by relying on these algorithms,
and reducing an individual’s life into neat categories, the
detention process fails to account for structural racism and biases
present in the U.S. criminal justice system.176 These claims have
171 Id. Similarly, when Maryland “replaced money bail with risk assessment, the
number of defendants allowed to return home to await trial increased, but a significant
number committed crimes and missed court dates.” Smith, supra note 168, at 469.
172 See Jennifer L. Doleac & Megan Stevenson, Are Criminal Risk Assessment Scores
Racist?, BROOKINGS INST. (Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2016/08/22/arecriminal-risk-assessment-scores-racist/ [https://perma.cc/5W5G-TSMF]; see also supra Section II.A.
173 Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PRO PUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://
www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing
[https://perma.cc/K4H9-TL4A].
174 Id.
175 Julia Dressel & Hany Farid, The Accuracy, Fairness, and Limits of Predicting
Recidivism, SCI. ADVANCES, Jan. 2018, at 1.
176 Former Attorney General Eric Holder, for example, was opposed to the use of
risk assessment tools due to the risk of disparate treatment of racial minorities. Massimo
Calabresi, Exclusive: Attorney General Eric Holder to Oppose Data-Driven
Sentencing, TIME (July 31, 2014, 1:35 PM), http://time.com/3061893/holder-to-oppose-datadriven-sentencing/ [https://perma.cc/6QR3-YD5J]. Similarly, in July of 2018, a coalition of
over 100 organizations released a joint statement expressing their concerns that risk
assessment tools will worsen incarceration rates and racial disparities. Shin Inouye, More
Than 100 Civil Rights, Digital Justice, and Community-Based Organizations Raise Concerns
About Pretrial Risk Assessment, LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIV. & HUMAN RTS. (July 30,
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not been unfounded, as the Pro Publica study also found that the
tools created racial disparities in risk scores between black and
white defendants.177 There, “[t]he formula was particularly likely
to falsely flag black defendants as future criminals, wrongly
labeling them this way at almost twice the rate as white
defendants.”178 Other studies of risk assessment tools have also
found the tools to be ineffective and discriminatory.179
The disparate impact on minority defendants can be
traced to the inputs used in the algorithms. Inputs like “prior
convictions, prior incarceration sentences, education, [and]
employment . . . are themselves the result of racially disparate
practices.”180 To illustrate this folly, African American and
Hispanic defendants are incarcerated at higher rates than white
defendants.181 These arrest rates are partly driven by the
divergent treatment of minorities in the criminal justice system.
Minorities are targeted more frequently by law enforcement
officials,182 arrested at higher rates for drug offenses183 and
prosecuted more severely than their white counterparts.184 In
2018), https://civilrights.org/more-than-100-civil-rights-digital-justice-and-community-basedorganizations-raise-concerns-about-pretrial-risk-assessment/ [https://perma.cc/Q9VJ-86QU];
cf Adam Neufeld, In Defense of Risk-Assessment Tools, MARSHALL PROJ. (Oct. 22, 2017),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/10/22/in-defense-of-risk-assessment-tools?ref=
collections [https://perma.cc/STW8-3DQL] (“Used appropriately, algorithms could help in
many more areas, from predicting who needs confinement in a maximum security prison to
who needs support resources after release from prison.”).
177 Even when isolating a defendant’s past crimes or type of crime from race, black
defendants were 77% more likely to be labeled as high risks for committing future violent
crime. Angwin et al., supra note 173.
178 Id. Furthermore, “[w]hite defendants were mislabeled as low risk more often
than black defendants.” Id.
179 See DANIELLE KEHL ET AL., BERKMAN KLEIN CTR. INTERNET & SOC’Y, HARV. L.
SCH., ALGORITHMS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: ASSESSING THE USE OF RISK
ASSESSMENTS IN SENTENCING 29 (2017), https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/3374
6041/2017-07_responsivecommunities_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/EX3N-YTTM] (discussing
studies that show risk scores heavily weigh certain types of crime that are
disproportionately policed in predominantly poor and minority neighborhoods); George
Joseph, Justice by Algorithm, CITYLAB (Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.citylab.com/equity/
2016/12/justice-by-algorithm/505514/ [https://perma.cc/5PKE-72N5] (noting that black
residents in Baltimore are more likely to receive high risk scores); Wendy Sawyer, Breaking
Open the “Black Box”: How Risk Assessments Undermine Judges’ Perceptions of Young
People, PRISON POL’Y INIT. (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2018/08/
22/blackbox/ [https://perma.cc/R3EQ-86H3] (one of the leading risk assessment tools
disproportionately factors in age, with “roughly 60% of the risk score it produces is
attributable to age”).
180 Stevenson, supra note 164, at 328.
181 See id. at 328 n.158.
182 See Jesse Wegman, The Injustice of Marijuana Arrests, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/29/opinion/high-time-the-injustice-of-marijuanaarrests.html?partner=rss&emc=rss&smid=tw-nytopinion&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/VSJ2-WTCP].
183 See ACLU, THE WAR ON MARIJUANA IN BLACK AND WHITE 9 (2013).
184 See, e.g., BESIKI KUTATELADZE ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUST., RACE AND
PROSECUTION IN MANHATTAN 3 (2014), https://storage.googleapis.com/vera-web-assets/
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essence then, “risk today has collapsed into prior criminal history,
and prior criminal history has become a proxy for race.”185 Thus,
these tools pose the potential “to significantly aggravate the
unacceptable racial disparities in our criminal justice system.”186
If predicting crime was as easy as plugging digits into a
computer, a kind of Minority Report type world, then we would
have no need for a criminal justice system.187 But the fact of the
matter is that these risk assessment tools are plagued by their
reliance on biased data that is “hard to correct for, and [therefore]
few even try.”188 Furthermore, “the empirical research evaluating
whether outcomes are improved by incorporating algorithmic risk
assessment into the decision-making framework is beyond thin; it
is close to non-existent.”189 Though eliminating financial
constraints is appealing, substituting a system that can be
ineffective and racially biased is not an adequate alternative.
B.

Electronic Monitoring

Electronic monitoring, as opposed to detention, of pretrial
defendants has been on the rise in many jurisdictions.190 “Most
[electronic monitoring] systems consist of an ankle bracelet,” linked
to a Global Positioning System receiver, which pretrial defendants
must wear twenty-four hours a day.191 For most pretrial defendants,
these monitoring devices essentially operate as a form of house
arrest.192 Although there is no centralized database documenting the
prevalence of electronic monitoring, it is estimated that in 2014
around one hundred sixty thousand of these devices were employed
downloads/Publications/race-and-prosecution-in-manhattan/legacy_downloads/raceand-prosecution-manhattan-summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QGD-VGHX].
185 Bernard E. Harcourt, Risk as a Proxy for Race: The Dangers of Risk
Assessment, 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 237, 238 (2015).
186 Id.
187 Minority Report, a short story by Phillip K. Dick that later was adopted into a
popular film, imagines a dystopian legal system where people are arrested for crimes prior
to their commission. See PHILIP K. DICK, THE MINORITY (COLLECTED STORIES OF PHILIP K.
DICK) (2013); MINORITY REPORT (DreamWorks 2002).
188 Stevenson, supra note 164, at 328.
189 Id. at 305.
190 See Electronic Monitoring: Proceed with Caution, PRETRIAL JUST. INST.:
PRETRIAL BLOG (Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.pretrial.org/electronic-monitoring-proceedcaution/ [https://perma.cc/7BKA-RNAQ] (excluding immigration cases, the number of
people supervised by electronic monitoring devices between 2005 and 2015 increased
from 53,000 to 125,000).
191 JAMES KILGORE, CTR. MEDIA JUST., ELECTRONIC MONITORING IS NOT THE
ANSWER: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON A FLAWED ALTERNATIVE, 7 (2015), https://centerfor
mediajustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/EM-Report-Kilgore-final-draft-10-4-15.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7CMA-UC4R].
192 Id. A person must seek permission from a supervising authority if they need
to go to school, therapy, work, etc. Id.
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in the criminal justice system.193 Proponents of these tools argue that
the cost of the devices are cheaper than incarceration and, unlike
pretrial detention, defendants have the freedom to return to their
communities and workplaces.194
But these devices are often ineffective in ensuring a
defendant reappears to court.195 A 2011 study by the Pretrial Justice
Institute found that “utilizing [electronic monitoring] as a condition
of pretrial release does not reduce failure to appear or rearrest
[rates].”196 Furthermore, these devices are often more restrictive
than they may seem at first glance. A defendant is often subject to a
plethora of limitations, including needing permission from their
supervisor to leave home, even in light of an emergency.197
These devices affect more than just a defendant’s
movements, and can have drastic effects on families, housing, and
medical care.198 For example, in Cook County one nineteen-yearold defendant could not return to his own home because Cook
County did not allow electronically monitored defendants to live in
Section 8 housing. This forced the young man to separate from his
family and sleep on the floor of his mother’s friend’s apartment.199
Compounding the problem with electronic monitoring is that these
devices also pose the same racially discriminatory problems
present in risk assessment tools.200 For example, the Chicago
Community Bail Fund found that African Americans in Cook
County made up around seventy percent of those placed on
electronic monitoring, despite being only twenty-five percent of the
overall population in Cook County.201
The main problem with monitoring devices lies in the
reasoning that because these devices are a better alternative than
incarceration, they should be used with more frequency. If a
Id. at 8.
See Wiseman, supra note 116, at 1349.
195 See Electronic Monitoring, supra note 190.
196 MARIE VANNOSTRAND ET AL., PRETRIAL JUST. INST., STATE OF THE SCIENCE OF
PRETRIAL RELEASE RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUPERVISION, 27 (2011), http://www.ajc.state.
ak.us/acjc/bail%20pretrial%20release/sciencepretrial.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZY2S-WRQG].
197 See KILGORE, supra note 191, at 12.
198 In Cook County, for example, a household must have no residents on parole or
on an electronic monitor in order to be approved as a host site. This can have the effect of
splitting up families and forcing pretrial defendants to live with family members who do
not want them or in areas where accessing employment is burdensome. See CHI. CMTY.
BAIL FUND, PUNISHMENT IS NOT A “SERVICE”: THE INJUSTICE OF PRETRIAL CONDITIONS IN
COOK COUNTY 7 (Oct. 24, 2017), https://chicagobond.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/
pretrialreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/6G75-V7GV]. In Michigan, similarly, a long list of
restrictive practices were found including “not being allowed to go to a hospital in an
emergency without first obtaining permission from the parole officer, regardless of the time
of day or the seriousness of the situation.” KILGORE, supra note 191, at 12.
199 See CHI. CMTY. BAIL FUND, supra note 198, at 7–8.
200 See supra Section III.A.
201 CHI. CMTY. BAIL FUND, supra note 198, at 13.
193
194
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defendant is deemed safe enough to be sent outside the confinements
of jail, it is unclear why he or she must also be penalized with an
electronic monitor. This reasoning further ignores the loss of the
presumption of innocence. Pretrial defendants have not been
convicted of crimes and, even if guilty, they are predominantly
accused of misdemeanors and small violations.202 The U.S. system
needs to be predicated on a presumption of liberty, not punishment,
and these electronic devices do little to further this ideal.
IV.

THE LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION: RESTORE AND RELEASE

The proposed solution to the cash bail problem does not lie
in an alternative, like risk assessments or an onerous system of
pretrial monitoring, but instead lies in a logical proposition:
restore the presumption of innocence and release the majority of
pretrial defendants. A system that has thrived on the backs of
indigent and minority defendants will not be dismantled by
increasing the state supervision of these populations. Instead,
this note proposes that a true fix lies in state bail reform
legislation that provides for the release of all pretrial defendants
charged with misdemeanors and ensures adequate procedural
safeguards and a presumption of release for those charged with
felony crimes.203 Using the success of the Washington, D.C. bail
system204 as a baseline, and ameliorating its shortcomings
through what studies and the laudable work of community bail
funds have taught,205 states can ensure a just and efficient pretrial
system that does not need punitive measures to function.

202 See Natapoff, supra note 149, at 1320 (noting misdemeanors make up the
majority of crimes in state courts).
203 Misdemeanors make up a substantial majority of crime in our state courts. For
example, in 2012 misdemeanors accounted for “approximately [eighty] percent of sampled
state dockets.” Id.
204 Washington, D.C. ended the practice of cash bail in the early ‘90s. As of 2018, it
released over ninety percent of pretrial defendants, and the vast majority of those released
return for their next court appearances. See Stephanie Wykstra, Bail Reform, Which Could
Save Millions of Unconvicted People From Jail, Explained, VOX (Oct. 17, 2018), https://
www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/10/17/17955306/bail-reform-criminal-justice-inequality
[https://perma.cc/Y3G8-3CT8].
205 Community bail funds will post the bail for a defendant and, in many cases, provide
pre-trial appearance resources, like counseling and text reminders. The bail funds have been a
resounding success in most jurisdictions. See Arvind Dilawar, Fighting Mass Incarceration with
a DIY Bail Fund, MASK MAG (Mar. 2018), http://www.maskmagazine.com/the-art-world-issue/
struggle/fighting-mass-incarceration-with-a-diy-bail-fund [https://perma.cc/WBZ5-2N5M]. The
Brooklyn Community Bail Fund, for example, had ninety-five percent of the defendants they
bailed out make all their scheduled court appearances. Furthermore, those who have been
released through the actions of the bail fund were three times as likely to have favorable case
outcomes. Our Results, BROOKLYN CMTY. BAIL FUND (2018), https://brooklynbailfund.org/ourresults-1/ [https://perma.cc/DFJ5-JJSF].
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Washington, D.C. Pretrial System: A Building Block

Ironically, the District of Columbia, the jurisdiction that
embodied the punitive turn in America’s criminal justice system in
the 1970s by becoming the first jurisdiction to authorize
preventative detention,206 has become the gold standard of pretrial
detention reform.207 In 1992, the D.C. Council passed the Bail
Reform Act that essentially ended the practice of cash bail in the
district.208 Thus, a defendants’ financial means plays no part in
pretrial incarcerations.209
D.C.’s success is the result of several important
implementations. First, the 1992 Bail Reform Act created “a
presumption of unconditional pretrial release.”210 Additionally, the
Act required a judge to determine if more restrictive conditions are
needed, and if so, to impose the “least restrictive . . . condition or
combination of conditions that the judicial officer determines will
reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and
the safety of any other person and the community.”211 The Act also
prohibits a judge from imposing financial conditions that results in
pretrial detention for the purpose of protecting public safety.212
The Act further provides procedural safeguards to ensure
both the timeliness of release and adequate justification for
detention. The Pretrial Services Agency213 must interview the
defendants within twenty-four hours of arrest, and bring them to
court within forty-eight hours of arrest.214 If the judge believes that
preventative detention is necessary, a hearing is held and “[t]he
government has the burden to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that no conditions of release will reasonably assure
appearance at trial and safety of the community.”215
206 President Nixon ushered in this punitive system through his District of
Columbia Court Reorganization Act of 1970. The act went beyond just preventative
detention and also contained provisions for “mandatory minimum sentences for repeat
offenders and ‘no-knock’ raids.” See Miller, supra note 16.
207 See Marimow, supra note 22; Ben-Achour, supra note 152.
208 See D.C. CODE § 23-1321 (2019).
209 See CHRISTINE BLUMAUER ET AL., PRINCETON U., ADVANCING BAIL REFORM IN
MARYLAND: PROGRESS AND POSSIBILITIES 33 (Feb. 27, 2018), http://wws.princeton.edu/
sites/default/files/content/Advancing_Bail_Reform_In_Maryland_2018-Feb27_Digital.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B3AE-VMJ8].
210 DOYLE ET AL., supra note 26, at 36; see also D.C. CODE § 23-1321(b) (2019).
211 DOYLE ET AL., supra note 26, at 36 (quoting D.C CODE § 23-1321 (c)(1)(B) (2019)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
212 D.C. CODE § 23-1321(c)(3) (2019).
213 The Pretrial Services Agency is “responsible for gathering information about newly
arrested defendants and preparing the recommendations considered by the [c]ourt.” What PSA
Does, PRETRIAL SERVICES AGENCY D.C., https://www.psa.gov/ [https://perma.cc/6SSW-SXZX].
214 Court Support, PRETRIAL SERVICES AGENCY D.C., https://www.psa.gov/?q=
programs/court_support [https://perma.cc/7QQT-K8FT].
215 DOYLE ET AL., supra note 26, at 37; (citing D.C. CODE § 23-1322(b)(2)(2019)).
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The system has been a great success with pretrial
defendants released ninety-four percent of the time.216 Of those
released pretrial, around ninety percent showed up to their
subsequent court appearance and only about ten percent were
rearrested.217 “Between 2007 and 2012 . . . . [n]inety-nine percent of
released defendants were not rearrested on a violent crime while
in the community.”218 D.C. has also employed many non-punitive
measures, like drug treatment and job counseling, to avoid
recidivism and focus on rehabilitating the pretrial defendant.219
While these pretrial services and counseling are expensive,220 they
are more affordable due to the reduction in jail population. D.C. is
estimated to have saved $398 million dollars annually because of
its comprehensive bail reform scheme.221
Although D.C.’s pretrial system should be heralded as a
success, it still suffers from a few important shortcomings that this
note addresses. For example, despite releasing over ninety percent
of pretrial defendants, D.C. still employs restrictive, probation-like
conditions, such as electronic monitoring, curfews, and supervisory
reporting requirements.222 Conditions like electronic monitoring
are invasive, affect the pretrial detainee’s individual and family
life, and are often employed in a racially discriminatory manner.223
Furthermore, a court imposing conditional release ignores the fact
that the individuals subjected to the restrictions are presumed
innocent, and instead treats them as criminals.224
D.C. has also pioneered the use of drug testing as a
condition of pretrial release, which is equally problematic.225 The
DOYLE ET AL., supra note 26, at 13.
Of the ten percent that were rearrested, a substantial majority were charged
with non-violent crimes. BLUMAUER ET AL., supra note 209, at 33.
218 BAIL PRIMER, supra note 33, at 15.
219 KIDEUK KIM & MEGAN DENVER, D.C. CRIME POL’Y INST., A CASE STUDY ON
THE PRACTICE OF PRETRIAL SERVICES AND RISK ASSESSMENT IN THREE CITIES 9–10 (2011).
220 The Pretrial Services Agency costs around sixty two million dollars
annually. BLUMAUER ET AL., supra note 209, at 33.
221 Id.
222 Spurgeon Kennedy, the Director of Research and Analysis for the Pretrial
Services Agency of D.C., outlined these conditions: “We supervise the majority of defendants
who do get released, and usually those conditions of supervision are things such as drug
testing; reporting to a case manager; for those defendants who we believe pose a greater
threat to community safety, we have the options of electronic surveillance, or more reporting
to case managers.” NEAL, supra note 10, at 41.
223 See supra Section III.B.
224 See David Feige & Robin Steinberg, Replacing One Bad Bail System with
Another, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/11/opinion/californiabail-law.html [https://perma.cc/XC2D-6Y7C] (“These conditional releases functionally create
an Alice-in-Wonderland, sentence-first-verdict-afterward world in which people presumed to
be innocent are nonetheless subject to the very sanctions they’d face if actually convicted.”).
225 “[The Pretrial Services Agency] and its predecessor, the D.C. Bail Agency,” have
been conducting drug testing programs since the ‘60s. See MARY A. TOBORG ET AL., ASSESSMENT
OF PRETRIAL URINE TESTING IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, NAT’L INST. JUST. vi (1989).
216
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use of drug testing is a burdensome restriction that ignores
addiction and disproportionately jails those arrested for drug
crimes (i.e., minorities and the poor).226 Additionally, studies have
shown that the use of drug testing as a pretrial condition “has been
shown to be ineffective at reducing failure-to-appear rates or
pretrial rearrest rates in a number of randomized control trials.”227
Finally, D.C.’s Pretrial Services Agency, which works in
tandem with judicial officers in deciding whether to detain a
defendant, employs risk assessment tools. As discussed previously,
these tools are of questionable efficacy and can help perpetuate
racially disparate detention outcomes.228 The D.C. risk assessment
tool utilizes socioeconomic inputs—including items to measure
“criminal history, demographics, current criminal charges, and drug
involvement”—which have been shown to contribute to racial
disparities in sentencing.229 D.C.’s success in reforming cash bail is
more likely attributable to its comprehensive reform package than
risk assessment tools.230 Beyond the aforementioned reforms, the
D.C. bail system also benefits from several unique characteristics:
“all of its judges operate in a single courthouse, which may reinforce
a culture of pretrial release; it has an extremely high-functioning
public defender system, which helps ensure proper representation
at pretrial detention hearings; and its pretrial services agency
receives funding from the federal government.”231
In essence, the D.C. system has had much success in
eliminating the use of cash bail. Nonetheless, in formulating a
solution to cash bail, state legislatures should avoid emulating the
use of onerous pretrial restrictions and risk assessment tools.
Instead, state legislation should focus on D.C.’s elimination of cash
bail and its presumption towards release. It should also build upon
D.C.’s procedural protections to ensure that felony defendants are
afforded their presumption of innocence.

See VANNOSTRAND ET AL., supra note 196, at 20–24.
Megan Stevenson & Sandra G. Mayson, Bail Reform: New Directions for
Pretrial Detention and Release, in REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE, VOL. 3: PRETRIAL AND
TRIAL PROCESSES 21, 44 (Erik Luna, ed., 2017).
228 See supra Section III.A.
229 See Matthew DeMichele et al., The Public Safety Assessment: A ReValidation and Assessment of Predictive Utility and Differential Prediction by Race and
Gender in Kentucky, at 8–9 (Apr. 25, 2018); supra Section III.A.
230 See Raphling, supra note 168 (arguing that risk assessment tools are not
successful absent other pretrial reform measures).
231 BAIL PRIMER, supra note 33, at 15.
226
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The True “Alternative”

In order to combat the inequities of cash bail and restore
the presumption of innocence, state legislatures should formulate
legislation that releases all misdemeanor defendants and provides
adequate procedural safeguards to the felony defendant
population. Releasing misdemeanor defendants will not only
mitigate the problem of mass incarceration but will also be a
positive step towards ending the racial discrimination prevalent in
the U.S. criminal justice system. Furthermore, by providing felony
defendants with adequate procedural safeguards, through longer
bail hearings and the right to counsel, we would ensure that the
presumption of innocence is more than a platitude, but essential to
the United States’ constitutional fabric.
1. Release Pretrial Defendants Charged with
Misdemeanors
Advocating for the release of the vast majority of pretrial
defendants232 would undoubtedly ring the alarm bell of pretrial
dangerousness to the community and the risk of nonappearance.
Community bail funds, however, have shown that this risk is not
pervasive and more based in fear.233 Community bail funds are
organizations that post the monetary bail on a pretrial defendant’s
behalf and often supervise and aid the defendant in reappearing to
court.234 The funds do not impose restrictive conditions, but instead,
often utilize simple check-in requirements if the specific fund so
requires.235 These check-in requirements can consist of simple, noninvasive tools, like phone or text notifications to ensure that a
232 Natapoff, supra note 149, at 1320 (noting that misdemeanor crimes make
up the majority of a state’s docket).
233 Critics of bail funds often use public safety rhetoric and other forms of
fearmongering to denigrate bail funds. See Raven Rakia, New Orleans Prosecutor Calls
New Bail Fund ‘Extremely Disturbing’, APPEAL (Nov. 28, 2018), https://theappeal.org/neworleans-da-stokes-fears-over-bail-fund/ [https://perma.cc/SH9M-2GVJ] (the District
Attorney of Orleans Parish “accused New Orleans Safety and Freedom Fund of ‘playing a
very dangerous game with public safety’”). But the success of these funds diminishes any
such criticism. The New Orleans Safety and Freedom Fund bailed out around two hundred
people in 2018, and ninety-two percent of those defendants returned to court. Id. Similarly,
when the Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights group began bailing out prisoners in Rikers
Island, the city’s district attorneys, mayor, and police commissioner all warned of the public
safety risks associated with such a bail out. The bail fund was very successful: of the ninety
people released from Rikers Island who had scheduled court appearances, only two failed
to show up. Jeffery C. Mays, 105 New York City Inmates Freed in Bail Reform Experiment,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/20/nyregion/bail-reformrikers-rfk-nyc.html [https://perma.cc/C5FJ-WVMJ].
234 Calaway & Kinsley, supra note 4, at 826–27.
235 Laura I Appleman, Nickel and Dimed into Incarceration: Cash-Register Justice
in the Criminal System, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1483, 1535 (2016).
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defendant is adequately informed of his or her future court case.236
Any other services, like a drug or alcohol treatment, are voluntary
on the part of the pretrial defendant.237 These funds have been
extremely successful and have shown the senselessness of money
bail and probation-like restrictions for pretrial defendants.238 For
example, in New York, bail fund clients reappear for their court
cases ninety-five percent of the time, and more importantly, are
twice more likely to win their cases than incarcerated individuals.239
The community bail funds have illustrated that there is no
need for cash bail, or other restrictive conditions, when it comes
to misdemeanor defendants.240 Instead, in releasing these pretrial
defendants, states should focus on what the community bail funds
have done correctly: providing adequate notification to the
defendant.241 Upon release of pretrial misdemeanor defendants,
state legislatures should provide a framework for an adequate
notification scheme to ensure reappearance. Studies have shown
that notification techniques can drastically increase the
reappearance rate of pretrial defendants.242 For example, “[t]he
available research shows that phone-call reminders can increase
appearance rates by as much as [forty-two percent], and mail
reminders can increase appearance rates by as much as [thirtythree percent].”243 Even something as simple as improving a
court’s website can provide a low-cost method of improving
reappearance rates.244
Practical utilization of non-invasive notification methods
has also shown success. In Coconino County, Arizona, for example,
the county tested different notification systems and found that the
236 See Jocelyn Simonson, Bail Nullification, 115 MICH. L. REV. 585, 603 (2017) (“[T]he
involvement of bail funds can vary from frequent and substantive contact, including counseling
and legal support, to minimal assistance with rides to court and reminder phone calls.”).
237 Appleman, supra note 235, at 1535 (2016).
238 See id. at 1535–37.
239 Emmeline Clein, Here’s How to Help End Cash Bail, NATION (Oct. 25, 2018), https://
www.thenation.com/article/heres-how-to-help-end-cash-bail/ [https://perma.cc/57KW-8NMQ].
240 See, e.g., Jancy Hoeffel, Tulane Professor: New Orleans Bail Rules Are Bad Law
and Bad Policy, ADVOCATE (Dec. 27, 2018, 6:00 PM), https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/
opinion/article_ed3a432a-0304-11e9-b7e8-c392b5182d82.html [https://perma.cc/F6WA-S2D3]
(“[S]cholars studying court systems in Colorado and Washington found that failure-to-appear
rates were no better for people released on bail bonds than for people released without having to
pay.”).
241 See, e.g., FAQ: What Should Replace Cash Bail?, supra note 28.
242 In Jefferson County, Colorado, for example, court appearance rates rose from
seventy-nine percent to eighty-eight percent when a defendant was reminded of their court
date a week in advance. Timothy R. Schnacke et al., Increasing Court-Appearance Rates
and Other Benefits of Live-Caller Telephone Court-Date Reminders: The Jefferson County,
Colorado, FTA Pilot Project and Resulting Court Date Notification Program, 48 CT. REV.
86, 89 (2012).
243 Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 227, at 11.
244 Id. (“[I]mproving court websites so that defendants can easily locate information
relevant to their case should increase the likelihood of appearance.”).
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failure to appear rate was reduced from twenty-five percent in a
control group to six percent in the notification group when a caller
directly reminded a defendant of their court appearance date.245 In
utilizing these notification techniques, a jurisdiction can reach the
results of a successful pretrial system, like D.C., while not
intruding on the individual defendant’s liberty.
Although critics may be concerned with the dangerousness
of releasing such a large number of pretrial defendants, these
arguments are misguided, even when putting aside their disregard
for the presumption of innocence. In D.C., for example, of the ninety
percent of defendants released pretrial, ninety-nine percent of
them were not rearrested for a violent crime pretrial.246 One might
contribute these figures to D.C.’s pretrial supervision and
restrictions on released defendants, but as discussed, the efficacy
of these restrictions has been shown to be wanting.247 Furthermore,
other jurisdictions who have released large amounts of pretrial
defendants have seen reductions in violent crime. In New Jersey,
for instance, violent crime has decreased by thirty percent since it
eliminated cash bail in 2017.248
In the long run, pretrial detention of misdemeanor
defendants may ultimately compromise public safety. A 2017
Stanford Law Review study conducted an empirical study of a
representative group of ten thousand misdemeanor offenders in
Harris County, Texas. The study suggested that if the 10,000
defendants were released pretrial, in a period of eighteen months,
there would be 2800 new misdemeanor charges and around 1300
new felony charges.249 In contrast, “if the same group were instead
detained, they would accumulate 3400 new misdemeanors and
1700 felonies over the same time period—an increase of 600
misdemeanors and 400 felonies.”250 Other studies have similarly
shown that the “short-run gains [of incarceration] are more than
offset by long-term increases in post-release criminal behavior.”251
Even if there is a small risk of recommission of crime, we
cannot give up liberty for a false sense of safety. Justice Jackson’s
statement in Stack v. Boyle addressing risk of flight rings equally
SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 13, at 33–34.
See BAIL PRIMER, supra note 33, at 15.
247 See supra Section IV.A.
248 Is Bail Reform Dangerous? What the Data Really Says, HOUS. CHRON. (Feb. 25,
2019), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/opinion/editorials/article/Is-bail-reform-dangerousWhat-the-data-really-13645640.php [https://perma.cc/264Q-2KJW].
249 Heaton et al., supra note 149, at 768.
250 Id.
251 Michael Mueller-Smith, The Criminal and Labor Market Impacts of
Incarceration 3 (Aug. 18, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://sites.lsa.umich.edu/
mgms/wp-content/uploads/sites/283/2015/09/incar.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9H3-YXPT].
245

246
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true for the risk of dangerousness: “Admission to bail always
involves a risk that the accused will take flight. That is a calculated
risk which the law takes as the price of our system of justice.”252
2. Ensure Adequate Procedural Safeguards for Felony
Defendants
Felony defendants, though charged with crimes of greater
magnitude, should be presumed just as innocent as any other
defendant. Thus, regardless of the crime committed, states should
ensure that legislation includes a rebuttable presumption of
release for felony defendants, with the burden shifted to the
prosecution to show why a defendant should be detained.
Furthermore, state legislatures should include two additional
procedural safeguards to ensure that a felony defendant’s liberty
is not taken away without due consideration: (1) longer bail
hearings; and (2) representation of counsel at bail hearings.
Bail hearings in most jurisdictions are extremely short,
and in some cases, these can be as short as a couple of minutes
per defendant.253 For instance, in 2016, Texas Organizing Project
obtained a video of bail hearings in Harris County, Texas where,
in nearly every case, the judge took a few minutes, and in some
cases even seconds, in rendering a bail amount.254 In one case, the
hearing officer set a $5,000 bond for a defendant, ignoring and
failing to even discuss the defendant’s history of homelessness
and dementia.255
The length of time for a hearing for a felony defendant
needs to be increased substantially because of the loss of liberty
that is at stake. Pretrial detention can drastically affect the
adjudication of a defendant’s case,256 hence the length of time for
a hearing needs to be adequate for a judicial officer to conduct an
individualized inquiry into the defendant’s case. That way, a
court can sufficiently consider and evaluate a defendant’s risk
level prior to making a determination on incarceration.

Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 8 (1951).
See Change Difficult as Bail System’s Powerful Hold Continues Punishing the Poor,
INJUSTICEWATCH (Oct. 14, 2016), https://www.injusticewatch.org/projects/2016/change-difficultas-bail-systems-powerful-hold-continues-punishing-the-poor/ [https://perma.cc/N7KC-46KM]
(noting some bail hearings lasted no longer than one minute); Stevenson & Mayson, supra note
227, at 4 (“It is common for such [bail] hearings to last only a few minutes.”).
254 Lise Olsen, Videotapes Reveal Flaws in Harris County Bail Bond Hearings,
HOUS. CHRON. (May 5, 2017, 8:34 AM), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houstontexas/houston/article/Videotapes-reveal-flaws-in-Harris-County-bail-10642138.php
[https://perma.cc/GQV3-BB8H].
255 Id.
256 See supra Section II.A.
252
253

1456

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:4

Critics may argue that costs would increase with
lengthier bail hearings, but the loss would be offset by the
release of misdemeanor defendants, thereby freeing up both
money and the court’s time.257 D.C., for example, saved around
$398 million a year by releasing the majority of pretrial
defendants. A recent article found that Cuyahoga County, Ohio
would save $45 million by switching to the D.C. bail model.258
Thus, other jurisdictions can use similar savings to fund costs
associated with longer hearing times.
Felony defendants should also be provided the right to
counsel at bail hearings, a necessary procedural safeguard when
their freedom is at stake. In Rothgery v. Gillespie County, the
Supreme Court held that when defendants hear the charge
against them and their liberty is subject to a potential restriction,
the adversarial process begins and the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel is implicated.259 The Court stated that once the right to
counsel is “attached,” the Sixth Amendment requires
representation by counsel “at any critical stage of trial.”260 But
because the defendant in the case did not challenge the denial of
reasonable bail, the Court left open the question of whether a bail
hearing constitutes a “critical stage.”261
Despite the Court’s lack of guidance on this issue, it is
clear that a bail hearing is a “critical stage” because it can
greatly imperil a defendant’s liberty interest by potentially
increasing a defendant’s conviction and sentencing rates.262 The
bail stage, and in many cases, most stages of adjudication, are
unfamiliar to a defendant who is not well-versed in the legal
process or aware of his or her legal rights. With an attorney’s
assistance, a defendant has a fair shot at explaining his or her
257 Washington, D.C. saved around $398 million a year when they ended their cash
bail system, nearly $1 million per day. Sara Dorn, How D.C. Court Reforms Save $398 Million:
Impact 2016: Justice For All, CLEVELAND (May 16, 2016), https://www.cleveland.com/metro/
index.ssf/2016/05/how_dc_court_reforms_save_398.html [https://perma.cc/6LX5-VH6K].
258 Id.
259 Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., 554 U.S. 191, 199 (2008).
260 Id. at 212.
261 Id.; Alexander Bunin, The Constitutional Right to Counsel at Bail Hearings, 31
CRIM. JUST. 23, 24 (2016). Three states have interpreted Rothgery to mandate counsel during
a bail decision. See Gonzalez v. Comm’r of Corr., 68 A.3d 624, 641 (Conn. 2013) (holding that
arraignment is a “critical stage” and defendant has right to effective assistance of counsel);
DeWolfe v. Richmond, 76 A.3d 1019, 1030 (Md. 2013) (holding that the Due Process Clause of
Maryland State Constitution entitles indigent defendant to state-furnished counsel at initial
bail hearing); Hurrell-Harring v. New York, 15 N.Y.3d 8, 20–21 (2010) (holding that
defendant must be provided counsel at bail hearings because of the liberty interest inherent
in these proceedings).
262 See Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 227, at 10 (“The recent studies showing
that pretrial detention substantially increases a defendant’s likelihood of conviction and
length of sentence support an argument that the bail hearing is a ‘critical stage.’”).
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individual situation and mitigating the risk of a judicial officer
conducting a cursory bail hearing.263
Some might argue that providing attorneys at these
critical stages would result in higher costs. But it is likely quite
the opposite. Studies have shown that legal representation of
pretrial defendants at the bail stage “can make a significant
difference in . . . jail costs.”264 A 2012, New York City study found
that those who were incarcerated prior to trial had a worse case
outcome, “leading to more costs for incarceration.”265 Jerry Cox,
the president of the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers, has also stated that representation at bail hearings
“leads to greater efficiency and more accurate results.”266
Representation of felony pretrial defendants at bail
hearings would likely not require greater expenditures for public
defenders’ offices. Public defenders have advocated for such
representation, and some have said the implementation would
bear them “little additional cost . . . [m]aybe one or two more
attorneys.”267 The proposal would also not be new, as Harris
County, Texas implemented a pilot program in 2017 that provided
for two public defenders to “be present at bail hearings for those
accused of misdemeanors and felonies.”268 In essence, by increasing
the length of bail hearings and attaching the right to counsel at the
bail stage for felony defendants, states can ensure a more just
pretrial system for those defendants who are at the greatest risk of
losing their freedom.
CONCLUSION
In Salerno, Justice Rehnquist stated that “[i]n our society
liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is
the carefully limited exception.”269 Cash bail has distorted any
263 Bunin, supra note 261, at 26 (advocating for defense counsel at bail hearings
and highlighting that “[i]f individual attributes of defendants were actually reviewed, and
indigence was considered, the constitutional violations would be resolved”).
264 Bryan L. Sykes, Cost Savings to Cook County When Arrested Persons Access Their
Right to Legal Defense Within 24 Hours, FIRST DEF. LEGAL AID (May 2014), https://www.firstdefense.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Cost-savings-report4.pdf [https://perma.cc/G3TH-QHFA].
265 Bunin, supra note 261, at 25.
266 Id.
267 Public Defender Should Be at All Initial Appearances, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESSNEWS (July 21, 2018), https://www.expressnews.com/opinion/editorials/article/Public-defendershould-be-at-all-initial-13092534.php [https://perma.cc/D52N-2EGA (internal quotation marks
omitted)].
268 Mihir Zaveri, Harris County to Place Public Defenders at Bail Hearings, HOUS.
CHRON. (Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/
Harris-County-to-place-public-defenders-at-bail-11002089.php [https://perma.cc/23BS-D2YE].
269 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
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sense of liberty and detention prior to trial has become more than
just a limited exception. Pretrial detention has wreaked havoc on
the lives of countless pretrial defendants, taking special aim at
indigent and minority defendants. But this does not have to be
the case. States have recognized that cash bail cannot be the
foundation of a just criminal justice system. But states will have
a long way to go if they continue to rely on alternatives that
perpetuate the same sins of the cash bail system they seek to
replace. Instead, state legislatures should pass bail reform laws
that release misdemeanor defendants and ensure adequate
procedural protection for felony defendants. The presumption of
innocence should not be disregarded as a worthless platitude, but
instead should be intrinsic to the idea of ordered liberty. By
releasing misdemeanor defendants and providing adequate
procedural safeguards for felony defendants, we can ensure that
there is liberty, untouched by fear.
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